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nuclear umbrella



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
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES	2
His Excellency Nobuhiko Ushiba Ambassador of Japan to the United States	
THE SYNERGY OF THE TRIAD	17
Gen. John C. Meyer, USAF	
AIR FORCE TRAINING AND OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY	26
Lt. Gen. George B. Simler, USAF	
SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL, JUNIOR OFFICERS, AND YOU	34
Col. Arthur R. Moore, Jr., USAF	
THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON THE CAMBODIAN OPERATION	45
Col. Russell H. Smith, USAF	
URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA	54
Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF	
Military Affairs Abroad	
NATO'S THIRD DIMENSION	65
Marshall E. Wilcher	
Books and Ideas	
WHAT WAS PAST WAS PROLOGUE	69
Dr. Russell F. Weigley	
100 AIRCRAFT ON PARADE	77
Royal D. Frey	
THE CONTRIBUTORS	87

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the cover

A free world partner "under the American nuclear umbrella" is the picture of Japan depicted in this issue by His Excellency Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japan's Ambassador to the United States, while General John C. Meyer, USAF Vice Chief of Staff, describes the Triad of forces required to sustain "sufficient strategic strength." Other contributors discuss the U.S. commitments in NATO and elsewhere in the world and the security measures being taken to make our defenses viable and credible.



RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

*Impact on the
Asian-Pacific Region*

*HIS EXCELLENCY NOBUHIKO USHIBA
Ambassador of Japan to the United States*

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THE JAPAN of today is a nation that has renounced military force as an instrument of national policy, apart from the inherent right of self-defense. Japan is constitutionally prohibited from maintaining a war-making potential. This commitment, which dates from the Occupation under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, has the deep support of the vast majority of the Japanese people.

Yet there is a seeming paradox to this kind of defense posture in a world where the survival of civilization depends on the precarious balance of enormous arsenals. The paradox seems even stranger when one realizes that Japan has now emerged as the third-ranking world power, in terms of national output, and may within a decade or so surpass the Soviet Union, to stand second only to the United States.

If at this point Japan is entitled to be considered a "superpower," then it is only fair to ask what role a *nonmilitary* superpower can play in the world of the 1970s. This is a question I should like to explore, since it has great bearing on Japanese-American relations and on the future stability of the Asian-Pacific region. As U.S. Commander in Chief, President Nixon, said to my Prime Minister some sixteen months ago:

The Pacific and Asia is the area of the greatest promise and also of the greatest peril. Whether Asia and the Pacific become an area of peace or an area of devastation, for Asia and the world, will depend on what happens between the United States and Japan more than between any other nations in the world.

In covering my topic I shall touch first on the strategic environment in which Japan finds itself and explain certain assumptions about Asian-Pacific security which are widely shared among the Japanese people. Against this background, I shall then discuss the objectives and strategies of Japanese defense,

economic and political policies for the 1970s, and their implications for the Japan-U.S. relationship.

Seen through Japanese eyes, the basic security equation in the western Pacific is a nuclear triangle composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. Japan lies directly within this triangle, as do divided Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Avoidance of nuclear war in this area depends, obviously, on the stability of this triangular power balance.

Moreover, Japan is a small archipelago, no larger in area than California. Its population of over 100 million is crowded into coastal patches of land that are highly vulnerable targets to intermediate-range missiles from the Asian mainland, or to missiles launched from submarines.

Yet this vulnerable Japan, extremely poor in natural resources, depends on world trade for the survival of its industries. Japan's trade lifelines pass through areas of potential conflict among the triangular powers—the Sea of Japan, Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean, as well as across the Pacific.

In this strategic environment it is understandable that the Japanese outlook on national security is quite different from that of a continent-size nuclear-armed power. Recognizing that their options are limited, the Japanese people have adopted three operating assumptions on which they base their security planning.

- The first of these assumptions is that *Japan does not have the potential to influence militarily the present nuclear equation in the Asian Pacific.* That is, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would add nothing to the stability of the existing nuclear triangle. Indeed, it could have an opposite, destabilizing effect, leading to an intensified arms race in the area. Therefore, for practical as well as


The four-legged "self-elevating ocean engineering platform" is used for geological examination of the sea bottom for the projected bridge that will connect Honshu and Shikoku islands.

constitutional reasons Japan has renounced nuclear weapons for its own use.

- The second widely held Japanese assumption is that *the existing nuclear power balance in Asia will remain stable as long as the United States maintains a military presence—and credible nuclear deterrent—in the western Pacific.* That is, we Japanese do not interpret the Nixon Doctrine as a formula for the withdrawal of American power from the Asian Pacific. We assume that the nuclear power balance—and the security of Japan from nuclear war—will continue to rest on the American deterrent. It is for this reason that my government favors continuing in force the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which places Japan under the American nuclear umbrella and provides the United States with forward military bases on Japanese soil.

Even with the triangle intact, nuclear war in Asia is still, of course, possible. The border conflict between China and the Soviet Union could escalate out of control, though this seems a remote possibility in light of the restraint both sides have exhibited throughout the period of the dispute.

A possibility with more dangerous and far-reaching consequences would be armed Chinese intervention in her peripheral countries as a rerun of the 1950 intervention in Korea. Again it is safe to assume that, in the light of historical experience, the countries concerned will exercise reasonable restraint to prevent miscalculation on the other side. It is also very much to be hoped that the Indochina conflict will continue to wind down and will in due course lend itself to settlement through negotiation.



Recognizing all these dangers, the Japanese people nonetheless assume that the most important factor in avoiding nuclear conflict in Asia is and will continue to be the U.S. deterrent as a visible presence in the area. Precipitous withdrawal of the United States from the western Pacific would, we believe, have very unsettling consequences and would drastically alter the strategic equation in which Japan finds itself.

- The third widely held Japanese assumption is that *the most likely threats to the stability and security of the Asian Pacific are nonnuclear, in the form of subversion, indirect aggression, or clandestine provocation of "wars of national liberation."*

These are the most ambiguous threats to the peace, and the most difficult to counter, as we have seen in various parts of South and Southeast Asia, from Burma to Indochina. A

The Japanese PS-1, world's newest seaplane, can take off and land in swells more than three meters high.



disciplined and determined guerrilla force, well supplied or even reinforced by a hostile neighbor, is an elusive and persistent enemy for any government to face.

As the American experience in Vietnam has demonstrated, even the direct intervention of a powerful ally cannot by itself insure the success of a government under guerrilla siege. The essential ingredients for internal stability include a government that not only possesses adequate security forces but also enjoys sufficient popular support to be able to isolate the guerrillas from the mainstream of the population and thus control them. We may speculate that success of the "Vietnamization" program now under way will depend on both these factors—not simply on the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces but also on the ability of the South Vietnamese government to maintain broad public support and confidence.

This is the fundamental challenge throughout the developing world, the challenge of building a viable nation-state, with the economic, political, and other resources to meet popular aspirations. Where this has not been accomplished, or where it is happening too slowly, the country is fertile ground for internal or external subversion.

One of the most important provisions of the Nixon Doctrine, as I understand it, deals with this self-help principle. The doctrine reaffirms American treaty commitments and the role of the U.S. deterrent where massive or nuclear aggression is threatened. In cases of small-scale conventional aggression, however, or internal subversion, the doctrine indicates that the local government must accept full respon-

sibility for its own security. Where appropriate, the United States may provide material assistance, but the human will and effort to survive can come only from those whose freedom and well-being are at stake.

The concept is wholly consistent with the Japanese outlook. The most likely threats to Asian peace and stability—the threats of subversion and "national liberation" wars—will diminish only as the nations of this area stabilize themselves economically and politically. This will, of course, take substantial outside help. Assistance in economic and social development is the one field of activity where the Japanese people believe they can make their most valuable contribution to peace-building in the Asian-Pacific.

AAGAINST this background, let us now explore Japanese policies for the 1970s in the areas of national defense and international economics and politics.

The Self-Defense Forces that Japan maintains operate within the three parameters: that our military capabilities are constitutionally limited to self-defense; that we reject nuclear armaments on both practical and constitutional grounds; and that our ultimate security rests on the U.S. deterrent, under Japan-U.S. mutual security arrangements.

The mission of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is to defend the Japanese people and territory from direct or indirect aggression—

or, more basically, to be strong enough to *deter* any such aggression. To accomplish this mission, Japan is currently spending about eight-tenths of one percent of its gross national product (GNP) to provide a compact, modern, all-volunteer defense establishment. Beginning in 1972, the Fourth Self-Defense Build-up Program will double these expenditures to \$16 billion over a five-year period, or an average \$3 billion a year.

The emphasis, under the new plan, will be on qualitative rather than quantitative improvements. For example, there will be virtually no increase in the current numerical strength of the ground forces, which will remain at 180,000 men. However, army mobility will be increased with armored personnel carriers, tanks, and helicopters. The maritime forces, or navy, will acquire high-speed rocket-armed hydrofoils, destroyers, and submarines for coastal defense. The air forces will replace their present F-86s with about a hundred F4EJ Phantom jets and will reach a planned strength of 900 aircraft, including 180 F-104J jets.

This will not give Japan, by 1976, a war-making potential or the capacity to conduct military operations beyond its own territories. It will insure Japan's capacity to defend the home islands—and American bases on those islands, including Okinawa—from any plausible level of conventional attack.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the depth of this commitment, among the Japanese people, to an exclusively self-defense military capability. It is a commitment rooted in memories of the last war, formalized in our Constitution, and reinforced by awareness of our vulnerability in the present nuclear confrontation.

Yet I believe it is apparent that a competent and sophisticated Japanese self-defense capability is an important contribution to regional stability, in the sense called for in the Nixon Doctrine. Japan clearly accepts full responsibility for its own security at the nonnu-

clear level, within the framework of its mutual security arrangements with the United States.

Equally important, this defense posture will permit Japan to concentrate its energies and resources during this decade on those aspects of peace-building which the Japanese people feel best equipped to perform: promoting economic development and political stability in the developing areas of Asia. This may be viewed as planned peace-building: a constructive assault on the gravest threats to peace and stability in the region—poverty, malnutrition, disease, hunger, inadequate education, underdeveloped industry and trade, and the other conditions which promote internal discontent and invite external intervention and subversion.

As third-ranking world economic power, with global trading interests and a vital stake in world stability, Japan has the obligation to invest its economic strength in international development. This obligation has special significance in developing Asia, where Japan is the only modern industrial power. Thus, in the future as in the past, Japan will devote a substantial portion of its development assistance to east and southeast Asian countries.

Total Japanese aid to all developing countries has quadrupled, from about \$300 million in 1964 to \$1.25 billion in 1969. Aid levels will continue to increase until we reach, by 1975, an annual level of aid equivalent to one percent of Japan's GNP. Since our GNP is growing at well over ten percent a year, this will mean approximately \$4 billion in foreign aid in 1975—about the same as total American foreign aid today.

Plans also call for continuing improvements in the quality of Japanese foreign aid. The proportion of outright grants will increase, and loan terms will become more favorable. Greater emphasis is already being placed on



The first Japanese F-4EJ jet fighter, produced at McDonnell Douglas Corporation, St. Louis

the kinds of aid and technical assistance which contribute fundamentally to nation-building and social modernization and, therefore, to political stability and regional security.

The level of Japanese aid channeled through multilateral agencies is also growing. For example, Japan was one of the organizers of the Asian Development Bank and is its principal source of capital. The Bank is an increasingly important instrument for preinvestment assistance to Asian countries in agriculture, fisheries, transportation, and communications. Similarly, Japan is a vigorous promoter of regional consultation and cooperation on economic development through such institutions as the Asian and Pacific Council and periodic Asian ministerial conferences on development.

Japan's private sector has a vital partnership role in this national effort. Through direct investment, joint ventures, resource-devel-

opment contracts, and training programs, Japanese companies are expanding domestic processing, manufacturing, and commerce as well as international trade throughout non-Communist Asia. Japanese business leaders, together with their counterparts in other Pacific nations, are contemplating setting up a multinational private investment corporation for Asia, to provide venture capital and technical and managerial assistance to local entrepreneurs in Asian countries.

There are, of course, political implications to economic activities on such a large scale, and we Japanese are acquiring some sensitivity in this regard. Nearly all the developing countries of Asia have recent memories of colonialism—Japanese as well as Western—and are jealous of their economic as well as political independence. We are learning the importance of a genuinely cooperative approach to our Asian partners, whether at government-


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
A weather station on snowy Kengamine Peak, highest point of Japan's sacred mountain Fujisan



Japanese Self-Defense Forces

Japan maintains compact, modern, nonnuclear, all-volunteer defense forces, for its own security and as its contribution to peace-building in the Asian-Pacific. An aircrew scrambles one of the 180 F-104s that will constitute about one-fifth of the planned strength of the air forces. . . . A formation of them in flight, maintaining deterrent readiness . . . The destroyer Amatsukaze, defender of its island nation . . . Nike Ajax protective missiles









Japan's Asian Development Bank

To diminish the vulnerability of Asian nations to aggression or subversion, Japan assists in their economic and social development. In the Republic of China—aluminum rolls are unloaded at the Taiwan Aluminum Corporation, which is undertaking an expansion program with the Bank's assistance. . . . In Ceylon—the Uda Walawe dam is a Bank-financed project. . . . In the Republic of Korea—the Seoul-Inchon expressway, 29.9 kilometers of four-lane limited-access highway, was financed by the Bank. . . . In the Philippines—a Bank staff member conducts a seminar in technical training of Filipino personnel to handle the water management project in Bulacan. . . .





In Malaysia—workers at a palm plantation that feeds into two palm oil mills in Bukit Mendi and Bukit Goh areas of the state of Pahang, the first two stages being financed by the Bank . . . In Singapore—industrial packing material in production under a subloan from the Development Bank of Singapore, borrowed from Asian Development Bank



to-government levels or in private-sector dealings. And out of our hard-earned experience we hope will emerge the channels for more effective regional cooperation in all areas of common concern.

Some degree of political consultation is taking place. In May 1970, for example, leaders of non-Communist Asia met in Djakarta to explore ways in which the states in the region could together contribute to a just and durable peace settlement in Indochina. The efforts begun there have yet to bear any fruit, but the habit of Asian political consultation is beginning to form. This is a healthy sign for the future, and it is a development which Japan will continue to encourage, in the interests of planned peace-building.

THIS brief summary of Japanese objectives and policies gives some idea of the constructive role a nonmilitary superpower can play in the turbulent world of the 1970s. It will not be a decisive role in the maintenance of today's precarious peace. It can be a very constructive role in making peace *less* precarious in the future.

Whether the world *has* any future will be determined primarily by the two nuclear-armed superpowers, and especially by the United States, whose steadfastness has been instrumental for a quarter-century in the prevention of general war. Japan, operating in nonmilitary spheres, hopes to make its principal contribution by helping to remove the most obvious causes of lesser wars, aggressions, and threats to the peace.

These policies have implications for Japanese-American relations. Japan and the United States are allies, not merely by treaty but, more fundamentally, in spirit. Both our peoples are deeply committed to political democracy, and both have grown strong through the free-enterprise system. In many important respects, especially in this postwar period, the United States has provided a

model for Japanese modernization. The forms of our development have remained uniquely Japanese, but our debt to America is considerable.

As our relationship has matured, we have become each other's best overseas customers, building a two-way trade that has quadrupled every ten years and now exceeds \$10 billion annually, both ways. American private investment in Japan has reached over \$1 billion, and the ties between our two economies are daily growing stronger through technological exchanges and joint ventures as well as trade, investment, and tourism.

In so close and dynamic a relationship, occasional frictions are bound to occur. The recent list of differences includes the question of regulating Japanese (and other Asian) textile exports to the United States, as well as American complaints about Japanese protectionism and Japanese complaints—to a lesser degree but still real—about American protectionism. I do not mean to suggest that such problems are trivial, but it is important for us to remember that they are "normal." That is to say, it is as natural for trading partners as for marriage partners to have disagreements and to need time and patience to work them out. Excessive passion, in either case, is a hindrance to reasoned negotiations.


What we must never lose sight of is the basic identity of interests that has made Japan and the United States partners in the first place. These interests include the mutually beneficial nature of our economic relationship, the complementary and mutually reinforcing nature of our security relationship, and, above all, the identity of our political objectives: of a more peaceful and better-ordered international system in which freedom can flourish.

In the words of poet Archibald MacLeish, "We are all riders on this planet earth together." Among all those riders, Japan and the United States have developed a special



Technical Assistance to Developing Nations

Japan shares advanced technical know-how with its friends. In Ceylon—an agricultural testing center . . . and a training center for upgrading the time-honored methods of fishing . . . In India—teaching the Japanese language, in order to facilitate international cooperation . . . In Kenya—instruction in scientific fishing techniques for eastern Africa



relationship with great potential consequences for the kind of world we want our children to inherit. President Nixon gave eloquent expression to this a little over a year ago when he said:


Peace requires partnership, . . . the new partnership concept has been welcomed in Asia. We have developed an historic new basis for Japanese-American friendship and cooperation, which is the linchpin for peace in the Pacific.

Japan accepts its share of this common burden and is charting a new course never before attempted by a major world power. In October 1970 my Prime Minister described our

aims to the United Nations General Assembly in these words:

World history has shown us that countries with great economic power were tempted to possess commensurate military forces. I should like, however, to make it clear that my country will use its economic power for the construction of world peace, and we have no intention whatever to use any major portion of our economic power for military purposes. It is the firm conviction of us, the Japanese people, based upon our invaluable historical experience, that only through the defense of freedom, adherence to peace and the promotion of the prosperity and peace of the world, will it be possible for us to ensure the security and prosperity of our own country.

Washington, D.C.



THE SYNERGY OF THE TRIAD

GENERAL JOHN C. MEYER

STRATEGIC deterrence is the most important job of the armed forces. Without it, all other service missions could be meaningless. Yet, to be effective, strategic deterrence requires positive actions by the military services and the public support which makes those actions possible. It also requires some understanding between the potential adversaries, to ensure that neither miscalculates the capabilities or intentions of the other. Over the past twenty-five years the United States has been

very successful in meeting those requirements.

But there is an irony in that success. The interest of many people in this vital peace-keeping role seems to have jaded. There are those who would falsely reason that because there has not been a world war for about a generation there is no need to do anything more to prevent such a war in the future. Or they may even argue that our present strategic forces can now be unilaterally reduced. That kind of logic, while pleasant to contemplate, just does not fit the real world.


With an issue as vital to the nation as strategic deterrence, I believe all Americans should understand just what the real world is—and what it is likely to be. They should know what the current strategic balance is and why we are concerned about it. They should know what the United States' part of

that balance is and the important role of the Air Force. And finally, they should understand where we are going with our strategic forces and how we hope to get there.

I am sure I do not need to spend much time developing how the strategic balance of forces contributes to world stability and to our national security. We need only look back to 1962 for an excellent example of how that balance works.

It was nine o'clock at night on Monday the fifteenth of October. Couriers were delivering reconnaissance photography to the President's most trusted executives. Twelve hours later, the U-2 photography of Cuba was laid out in front of President Kennedy. The evidence of missiles was absolute. By 11:45 that morning the President had ordered an increase in reconnaissance coverage: he had to know how

A Soviet missile transporter of the type discovered en route to Cuba in the fall of 1962



ast the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment was growing.

At that time we had almost 400 land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles that could strike the Soviet Union; they had 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). They also had submarines that had to surface to launch short-range missiles. If all of them had been in launch position, they would have totaled fewer than a hundred missiles. In strategic bombers configured to strike the enemy in his homeland, we had 1600; the Soviets had just fewer than 200 long-range aircraft. Another factor was our general purpose forces—our air, ground, and sea forces.

By Monday the 22d of October the President had charted the nation's course. We had a three-to-one advantage in missiles, counting all the Soviet submarines, and an eight-to-one

advantage in bombers. The President announced the quarantine of Cuba.

By Sunday, Moscow radio was reporting that the Russians would dismantle and return their missiles to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been deterred, and the crisis had passed.

The Cuban crisis put our system and our purposes to the test; it is now also rich in lessons on how deterrence works. Here are two of them:

The first deals with reconnaissance and surveillance. Photography was absolutely essential, for without it we would have been hard pressed to know what was going on at our doorstep. And, more important from a political perspective, we would have had trouble substantiating the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba to our own government and to the United Nations. High-resolution photography

The Soviets have over 900 operational SS-11s today, each with multiple re-entry vehicles.



turns out to be far more convincing than any number of verbal assertions.

The second lesson of Cuba had to do with leading from strength. By having the balance of strategic strength, we were able to dominate the play in terms that the Soviets could easily understand. There was no question about our having sufficient strategic strength, and they *were* deterred.

Now, if someone asks me today how much is "sufficient strategic strength," I am going to have to admit that I am not sure. In my opinion it is a question that might best be answered in hindsight, and of course then it could be too late. In 1962 a superiority of ten to one in effective ballistic missiles and of almost that ratio in bombers on alert was at least sufficient. But that was 1962.

Today we have a different situation and a different game plan. The Soviets now have nearly 1500 operational land-based ICBM's, with others under construction, including some new silos unlike any we have seen before. When current construction is completed, about 300 will be SS-9s or SS-9-type missiles, with their large payload and versatile applications. These are the missiles that can carry a single warhead yielding up to 25 megatons or three warheads yielding 5 megatons each. Just where the Soviets will stop in missile deployment is still an open question.

Recently we observed Soviet testing of multiple re-entry vehicles on an SS-11 variant. They have over 900 SS-11s operational today. The thought that each of those silos could accommodate an SS-11 with multiple re-entry vehicles is cause for serious concern.

The Soviets also have at least 17 Polaris-type submarines operational, each carrying 16 missiles. That adds up to 272 more ballistic missiles, not to mention about another 90 on older submarines. The total Soviet operational ballistic missile threat today, then, is 1857 missiles—and still growing. The estimate for 1973, when current construction is completed on silos and another 15 submarines, is a de-

ployed force of about 2250 ballistic missile launchers on land or at sea.

In addition to those ballistic missiles, the Soviets maintain a force of bombers and aerial refueling tankers. Their strategic air force consist of around 200 Bear and Bison long range bombers and tankers and over 700 Badger and Blinder medium bombers. While this fleet has declined slightly in size in recent years, its use in strategic training exercises has actually increased.

And lest one think that the Soviets have lost interest in bombers, let me add that they are testing a new swing-wing strategic bomber prototype. It is considerably larger than our swing-wing FB-111 and could be operational in 1973.

I do not mean to go through a complete description of the Communist military forces that weigh on the balance of power. I have not mentioned Soviet ballistic missile defenses either deployed or in development. I have not talked about their operational Mach 3 interceptor, the Foxbat. I have skipped over their technologically advanced and growing anti-submarine forces. And I have not touched on Chinese nuclear capabilities. But I have described enough to give a feel for the other side of the balance. It is massive military power by any standard, and it is still growing.

My second point concerns our side of the strategic military balance and our strategy. The strategy is clearly one of deterrence, but the question of deterrence cannot really be separated from that of what happens if it fails. The questions are closely related, and the military forces that would be involved are the same.

The idea is to exhibit sufficient military strength to convince any would-be attacker that he will be worse off if he attacks us. Of course "sufficient" has to be interpreted through the eyes of the would-be attacker, and that is subject to considerable uncertainty. Still, our job is to make sure that no enemy miscalculates our ability to survive and

track and still have sufficient force to retaliate and do unacceptable damage to him. The means to this end are reconnaissance and surveillance combined with the Triad of strategic forces.

Our surveillance and warning program is the aggregate of many diverse inputs and indicators, but for the present purpose I will limit my discussion to those systems that would provide warning of actual missile attack.

The first of these is the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System—or BMEWS. It has been operational since 1964 and consists of three radar sites. The BMEWS would provide about a 15-minute warning of a mass ICBM attack. It also indicates launch areas and trajectory impact points.

Of course the BMEWS is not foolproof—and I would emphasize that no system is. The BMEWS has gaps in its coverage. It looks to the north and cannot “see” the “long way round” missiles that could come at us from the south. Its capability is also limited against depressed-trajectory missiles that could come in under the radar coverage.

But the utility of the BMEWS is supplemented by another network of radar coverage that blankets much of the Soviet Union and China. It is called over-the-horizon radar. It, too, gives warning of a mass missile attack and provides more warning time. We have been operating the over-the-horizon radar as a test system since early 1966. In more than three years of testing and operation, the system has detected and reported a large number of ICBM-type launches. It gives us great confidence that there would be only a very remote chance of missing a salvo of as few as five missiles.

Although this over-the-horizon radar does not provide the same detailed information as BMEWS, it makes a significant contribution to warning. It fills the gaps in the BMEWS and provides earlier warning. Of course we would like even earlier warning, together with more

Russian Aircraft

Ballistic missiles have not supplanted manned aircraft in the Soviet arsenal. It includes long-range bombers, medium bombers, and fighters, represented (top to bottom) by the Bison, the Blinder, and the MiG-23 Foxbat.



detailed information. I will describe what we are doing about that later.

Now, let me turn to the Triad of strategic offensive forces. These forces have been described in detail in many sources, but I would like to re-emphasize the important contribution that the Triad makes. This three-pronged approach consists of Air Force land-based missiles and long-range bombers together with Navy missile-carrying submarines. The point I want to make is that this combination of forces significantly increases our confidence in continuing to deter attack.

The most obvious reason for greater confidence is the added reliability of multiple independent approaches. An unforeseen vulnerability in any one system would not put us out

of business. For example, as the Soviets continue their high-priority programs in antisubmarine warfare, we can still deter an attack.


Then there are the advantages associated with each type of system. Well over 95 percent of the land-based ICBM's are constantly on alert, 30 minutes from their targets. They are reliable and accurate. Today we have 1054 of these missiles: 54 Titans and 1000 of the Minuteman.

Last year we completed our development flight-test program on the Minuteman III and these are just beginning to enter the inventory. The Minuteman III has such added advantages as a multiple independent re-entry vehicle capability. By 1975 we plan to have a Minuteman force that will be just about evenly divided between Minuteman IIs and IIIs.

The manned bomber is an entirely different

U.S. Aircraft

The current fleet of B-52s will yield to the FB-111 entering the inventory (below). The B-1 (right) in development, will exceed by speed and versatility what it may lack in size compared with the B-52



and of deterrent force. It can be launched and then recalled without ever penetrating enemy airspace. It can be rerouted en route. It can be on airborne alert outside our continental limits and out of range of enemy defenses. When ordered to attack, the manned bomber can strike a series of targets with a variety of weapons. It can also be reused.

Today, we have close to 450 operational bombers. Nearly all of them are B-52s, although a few FB-111s are entering the inventory. The B-52s have the versatility to carry free-fall bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and decoys; the FB-111s will only carry free-fall bombs until a new air-to-surface missile now in development becomes operational. The number of these bombers, and their supporting tankers, that are on alert can be varied in response to international tensions. In the absence of any abnormal tensions, something

like one-third of the force would be on alert.


The third part of the Triad consists of missile-carrying submarines. They offer yet a different type of targeting problem to the Soviets. The fleet includes 41 ballistic missile submarines, each of which carries 16 missiles. About half of those submarines are in firing position at any one time; the rest are en route, being serviced, or in overhaul.

These three systems, operating in concert, complicate an enemy's defense problems and limit his offensive strategies. For one thing, they put a strain on his resources. He must divide those resources between offensive and defensive forces. Those that go to defense must then be further divided among antiballistic missile systems, anti-aircraft systems, and antisubmarine warfare systems. He must also spread out his top-grade scientists, engineers, and managers. The resulting dilution in defenses is tantamount to increased capabilities for our strategic offensive forces. At the same time, resources used for defense are no longer available for offensive systems.

Then too, and perhaps most important of all, our combination of strategic forces presents an enemy strategist with an extremely severe problem in timing. A simultaneous surprise attack on all elements of the Triad is virtually impossible, and a strike on any one element gives warning to the others. Thus—and this is a point worth emphasizing—the advantage of a first-strike surprise attack is largely foreclosed by the Triad of strategic forces. To quote the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, “. . . each of these force categories is of . . . critical significance; for each strategic force has its own inherent strengths. . . .”

In effect, then, there is synergy in the Triad which adds value beyond costs. And while the total value of the Triad cannot be measured in strictly quantitative terms, it has been sufficient in the aggregate to deter attack.

But there is no guarantee that what has been sufficient will continue to be. As a result,



I am concerned about where we are going and how we will get there. And that is the third area I want to cover.

I would start with a sobering observation: the Soviets have built a strategic military force of about the same stature as our own. But parity does not seem to be their objective. The pace of their weapon development and deployment is sufficient to cause concern. To this can be added the growing importance of the Chinese Communist nuclear threat. They could have an ICBM capability as early as 1973—two years from now.

Yet we see our own strategic forces remaining relatively constant numerically. That is a real cause for concern. It makes me very uneasy to consider the possibility of a preponderance of military force on their side of the balance. It could lead to the prospect of psychological blackmail.

One way of avoiding that kind of problem is to keep pace quantitatively and qualitatively. I am certainly encouraged by the President's 20 May 1971 announcement that the quantitative pace may be slowed through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

With respect to quality—and here I mean technological quality—we cannot afford to wait for someone else's technological breakthroughs and their associated surprises.

Of course, the Soviets recognize this situation as well as we do. This year they are expected to spend the equivalent of more than \$16 billion on military and space research and development. The comparable U.S. figure is about \$10 billion. In terms of people, the Soviets are adding 230,000 engineers every year while we add 35,000. Further, they are keeping all of theirs employed on priority research and development projects.

Since we cannot meet the Soviet technological challenge on a dollar-for-dollar basis, we have to be very selective in our R&D program.

At the same time we have to be sure we cover all the important bets, both strategic and tactical. And that is what we are trying to do.

One very important development program for continued deterrence is the satellite early warning system. With this system we expect to get greatly improved overall warning capability against enemy missile launches, and we will get it for both land-launched ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This kind of warning will benefit all the strategic forces in the Triad by providing more of the valuable commodity, time. And it will give us even more time to get the manned-bomber force into the air—even in the face of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

We are also working on the development of a new bomber, the B-1. This new aircraft is being designed to penetrate the more sophisticated air defenses being developed by the Soviets and still get its weapons on target. It will be significantly smaller than the B-52, both in actual size and, perhaps more important, in its radar reflectivity. This means it will be able to get to its targets with less chance of detection. The B-1 will be able to carry almost double the load of a B-52 while flying lower, faster and farther. And, of course, it will continue to offer all of those advantages peculiar to the manned bomber: it can be launched, recalled, and reused; it can be rerouted en route; it can be on airborne alert; and each sortie can strike many widely dispersed targets with a variety of weapons.

We are also flight-testing a versatile short-range attack missile to add new nuclear capabilities to our present bombers, as well as the B-1. This new missile is called the short-range attack missile (SRAM). It can get to its target on a high arching ballistic path, or it can hug the earth in an all-low-altitude attack. In either mode, the SRAM will substantially increase the enemy's air and missile defense problems.

These new systems, as well as others in development, should keep the strategic balance

from tilting against us, at least in a qualitative sense. They will do this by being able to penetrate the newer and more effective defenses that are evolving. And they will protect us against technological surprise.

In this business, though, we have to face the fact that no one is ever really sure. We know we could do more in system development, and we know we could move faster on some of the systems now in development. But we also know that either of those alternatives would cost more money—money we do not now have. At the same time, we see the Soviets going more and moving faster. In that context, we have to be sure that we continue to have sufficient strategic forces, but it is a risky business at best.

IN THIS ARTICLE I have focused on the primary element of our military power—nuclear deterrence. The role of the Air Force in our national strategy of nuclear deterrence is a very vital role and one that gets a good deal

of attention. Even more important, I reiterate, is the strength of the Triad of strategic forces in the reinforcing effect provided by each of the different types of forces. That is, there is a synergistic relationship between bombers and land-based and sea-based missiles. It is the kind of relationship that assures real deterrence, since an attack on one gives warning to the others.

But deterrence, once achieved, does not continue indefinitely. It has to be maintained and modernized if it is to stay effective. For that we need new systems capable of deterring any enemy in the future. We think we have those new systems "on track," but it is going to take a lot of work and support to keep them on track. One way to get that support is to make sure that all of us in the Air Force and in the other services—as well as the public at large—understand the inherent strength of the interlocking parts of the Triad and why that strength is in fact the real measure of strategic deterrence.

Hq United States Air Force



AIR FORCE TRAINING AND OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE B. SIMLER

WE in the Air Force have for many years looked at our contribution to national effectiveness in purely military terms. It is our mission to provide air power when and where required to support national policy. However, to hold this important viewpoint in isolation from another equally important contribution is to be shortsighted.

Today we are in an era of massive social change, particularly changes in the attitudes of the nation toward priorities for national defense versus the need to

evote resources to solve internal problems. It may well be a symptom of a more dangerous undercurrent of opinion that the military services are somehow siphoning off the money which should be going into the solutions of domestic problems. In other words, the military services are portrayed as users of our society's manpower and wealth rather than providers of a productive service to the nation. Military manpower is decreasing, and funds for defense in the national budget are being reduced. The number of persons serving the Air Force dropped from 856,000 in June 1964 to 791,000 in June 1970 and slipped to 757,000 in July 1971.¹

The funding plans for the armed forces show a similar trend. The administration's request for funds for the military in FY 1972—78.7 billion—represented only 32.1 percent of the total federal budget, the lowest percentage since 1950.² More than \$20 billion of this is programmed for military pay, and an additional \$3.7 billion is being requested to provide pay increases and other changes in support of the all-volunteer force. Consequently, procurement of new hardware and maintenance of existing weapon systems are serious management problems.

The fact is generally overlooked that the armed services play an important sociological role in the sphere of education and training. While we train airmen to perform the tasks necessary to operate a modern Air Force, we are at the same time teaching skills that make these airmen more useful citizens when they return to the civilian world. This year more than 160,000 airmen and officers will leave the Air Force. Many of them will return to school, although not so many as we sometimes like to think. A study conducted in 1967 showed that only 15 percent of the airmen released from the service went to school.³ The rest entered the job market. These airmen who leave the Air Force will have to compete for jobs in today's highly competitive job market. If we are to contribute optimally to the

nation's good, then it is our responsibility to insure that, within the constraints of operational military exigencies, those airmen are prepared to earn a living—and a good living.

While we may properly argue today that the Department of Defense performs a sociological role, that has not always been the case.⁴ The skills required of a military man were, for many years, only marginally related to civilian labor requirements. Prior to World War I the armed forces were considered as an institution apart from the civilian flow of life. There was little manpower movement between the military and civilian sectors. Military training focused on combat skills for which few civilian counterparts existed.

When our first major world war necessitated the induction of many civilians into the military, it became quickly apparent that some consideration of skills and aptitudes was necessary in the military classification process. The range of these military occupations was limited and provided little assistance to the postwar adjustment problems of veterans seeking civilian employment. This divergence in occupational structures was due in large measure to the lack of technological growth in the military compared to that in civilian organizations. The automobile and truck came into the forces, and a few airplanes were reluctantly accepted. But the embryonic military specialists of the early 1920s had difficulty in achieving maturity. A belief in the permanence of future world peace permeated the nation and so reduced the size of the armed forces that technological and educational growth was largely stymied.

World War II taught the nation how to convert civilian skills to military occupations during a crisis. The military recognized that previous education and experience were related to the capability of the armed forces to mobilize rapidly. And manpower planners quickly became aware of the reliance that both the military and civilian sectors would have to place on highly trained personnel.

Since World War II, developments in nuclear capabilities, advancements in electronics, and other technological changes have created demands by the armed forces for greater technical skills. These military requirements mirrored a civilian society which already was mobilizing its energy and expertise to increase the output of better trained and educated manpower. And the emphasis on education in the civilian society—60 percent of the 1968 high school graduating class entered college—has led to a questioning, articulate, and capable military work force. A commonality of need was created in both military and civilian organizations for the high talent manpower pool that education has provided. It is this commonality of need that has enhanced the armed forces as a national resource.



While we are managing the military hardware required to defend our nation, we are concurrently providing vocational and technical training to young men and women of the Air Force. In the early sixties the U.S. Department of Labor conducted a survey of adult formal training. Training in the armed forces was shown to be the most important labor source for three occupations—airplane mechanics, bakers, and dental technicians—and an important secondary source for eleven others.⁵ The age distribution of the sample suggested that the military training of the World War II and the Korean War time periods was being measured. Another study disclosed that 30 percent of a small group of ex-Air Force electronics technicians were employed in comparable civilian electronics occupations.⁶ Analysis of the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* (DOT) indicates that more than 90 percent of the Air Force career specialties have equivalent or comparable civilian skills. The Air Force rate, incidentally, compares favorably with the 11 to 14 percent average of non-DOT specialties found to exist throughout the military establishment.

By comparing these figures with the total output of the Air Force, we can get an idea as

to the scope of this training. The Air Force recruits new personnel at a rate of about 100,000 a year. If our force is to remain constant, that means we release roughly 100,000 a year. Of the basic trainees who enter the Air Force, about 80 percent go to one of our technical schools for job training. The remaining 15 percent go to duty bases where they receive training while on the job. In all, the Air Force's primary training organization, Air Training Command, conducts some 375 courses in subject areas ranging from electronics and missile propulsion and guidance to intelligence, photography, and security police. Approximately 10,700 instructors and 400 classrooms are used.

All this training is vital to the proper functioning of the U.S. Air Force and is equally relevant to the social structure of society. Those who receive skill training in the Air Force put that same training to productive use in a civilian job. Successful job placement is related to skill training, demand for the skill capability for cross-training into a comparable civilian skill, and willingness of the ex-service man to locate in an area where his skill can be utilized. It is an established fact that the Air Force is providing vocational and technical training on a scale and at a skill level necessary to equip men to find jobs in the civilian world. This vocational and technical training with its associated pay and personal benefits is unmatched. And we would anticipate that within certain limits, there will be a continuing demand for those skills.

Despite the recent downtrend in the economy and the present high unemployment rates, the Department of Labor is predicting that the number of jobs in the economy will continue to increase, reaching more than 10 million by 1980.⁷ The service-producing industries over the next 10 years are expected to grow rapidly and to employ 59.5 million by 1980, an increase of 35 percent above the 1968 level. The goods-producing industries will also increase in the years ahead, although



at a slower rate than the service industries. Employment in goods-producing industries is expected to increase to about 30 million in 1980, 10 percent above the 1968 level. Other occupational workers are in such areas as the professional and technical fields, management, clerical, sales, and others. Requirements for workers in these areas will be increasing as well—in some specialties at rates up to 50 percent. While job growth is significant, another key indicator of job outlook is the need for replacements. More jobs will be created in the years ahead through normal attrition, such as retirements, than from employment growth.

Thus the future looks bright for the military man with a civilian-applicable skill who separates in the years ahead, provided he is willing to settle in a geographic area where his talents can be utilized. But the question still has not been answered: Does a man use his military skills after separating from the service?


A survey of 858 former Air Force members was conducted by an AFIT student in an effort to answer this question.⁸ In his analysis, he divided the respondents into two groups by military skill: those in technical areas and those with "military services" skills. The second group consisted primarily of individuals trained in skills that were usually found only in the military, such as individuals trained to fill out specialized forms. These former Air Force members generally characterized their military experience as contributing positively toward their civilian employment experiences. About 80 percent of the officers surveyed reported that their military experiences had helped them. And almost 70 percent of the enlisted men with technical skills said that their military experience aided them. Almost half of the enlisted men who worked in the military services skill areas reported that their training helped them in their civilian employment. It seemed that active service in purely military occupational specialties without technical training was of less benefit to the indi-

vidual. By contrast, technical skill training and experience in the military appear to be readily transferred to civilian jobs.

Another obvious benefit the Air Force affords lies in the accreditation of its courses. Many of the courses offered by the military meet the requirement for accreditation of service experience by the American Council on Education. Many airmen who leave the service and go back to school find that their training can be used for college credit, thus shortening the time until they leave school and become a part of the national labor force. Another example of this is the medical school at Sheppard AFB, Texas, whose new physician's assistant training program is recognized by the American Medical Association and Midwestern University. The graduates can be licensed in several states, where they will make a real contribution to the national need for medical services.

MORE than 90 percent of the hundreds of skills in which the Air Force trains thousands of men yearly have direct counterparts in the civilian community, and most of these men will return to the civilian economy and enter the labor market. Those who return to school may find they have the bonus of accreditation for the training they have received in the Air Force.

Thus the Air Force, through its training can be considered one of the nation's great resources, and we must continue to foster this resource in several ways. First, as long as retention is a problem, we must demonstrate our training role during recruitment. Since a large number of men who enter the Air Force do so to learn a skill, we must make absolutely certain that the quality of our training is exceptional. This is particularly important as we face the conflict of paying tax dollars for unemployment compensation on one hand while on the other hand job and vocational training





opportunities are available in the military services.

Second, we must utilize those skills our personnel had prior to military service. When a man possesses a skill before he enters the service, chances are he will use that skill when he leaves, despite whatever job he may have held in the Air Force. An officer will probably return to the field he studied in college. Unless the Air Force utilizes preservice abilities and skills, it is not making the best possible use of the nation's human resources.

Third, the Air Force must continue to provide an opportunity for achievement, responsibility, and personal success to those who need it and have the ambition to avail themselves of the opportunities provided by military service. Both technical training and military training lend themselves to this purpose, for both instill a high degree of personal and team discipline. A technician must be precise and must follow technical data, while his military training teaches him respect for authority and adherence to procedures.

Finally, we must keep in mind that we are training today for the labor force of the future. When a man enters the Air Force today, the chances are good that whenever he leaves the Air Force he will enter the civil job market. We must make certain that the skill he learns in the Air Force is not out of date when he leaves. Thus the Air Force has a responsibility to utilize only the most modern of techniques in its training as well as its day-to-day operation.

The Air Force not only provides for the physical security of the nation; through its training programs it contributes a great deal more. We feel that Air Force education and training are among the most powerful incentives we can offer to young people who will consider Air Force service. It is through these training and education programs that we demonstrate to the public our concern for solutions to sociological problems while providing adequate air power for national defense.

Hq Air Training Command

Notes

1. *Armed Forces Journal*, 15 February 1971, p. 25.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

3. Robert Brooks Richardson, "An Examination of the Transferability of Certain Military Skills and Experience to Civilian Occupations," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, September 1967, p. 145.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.


6. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

7. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment Outlook*, Bulletin 1650-117.

8. Richardson, *op. cit.*

SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL, JUNIOR OFFICERS, AND YOU

COLONEL ARTHUR R. MOORE, JR.



WHAT is the matter with today's junior officers? Why do they keep pushing against the system? Why is there a "generation gap" in the U.S. Air Force? What are we teaching these kids? These are questions all commanders are asking or being asked today.

Squadron Officer School (sos) is in a unique position to seek answers to these questions. Why? Because junior officers are our business, our only business. We educate, evaluate, and attempt to challenge about 2400 officers each year—officers whom *you* send to us, and who return to *you* 14 weeks later. As supervisors, you and I both feel a *need* and a *responsibility* to understand these officers. Therefore, in these few pages, I intend to address some of these more provocative questions in hopes of making the Air Force a better place for you and for the junior officers of your command.

To begin, what is the matter with junior officers today? After observing several thousand students at sos, I must say simply—nothing. Nothing is the matter with today's new breed. They are the best educated, most eager and dynamic group of men any air force has had anytime, anywhere. sos classes have included pilots who have earned the Medal of Honor, blue suit scientists who have probed the edges of the unknown, missilemen who operate systems you and I thought only Buck Rogers could operate not too many years ago, women of the Air Force eager to secure a place in today's and tomorrow's Air Force second to none, and officers from every career field and every major command in the Air Force.

These officers are being taught some of the same problem-solving techniques that were taught at the Squadron Officer Course (soc) (predecessor to sos) 18 years ago. They are being challenged mentally and physically by a number of the field leadership exercises that you may remember if you attended the soc of the early fifties. Today's students are making

many of the same mistakes that 50,000 other sos students made before them, but they are also doing some of the same things correctly. This is not to say that our curriculum and methodology have been standing still. The requirements of the Air Force have changed in the last two decades, and the school has changed to meet those new requirements.

During this calendar year, for example, our management curriculum has been completely revised to insure that our graduates are prepared to use today's techniques on today's problems. We give our students a chance to study and work with such management techniques as systems analysis, probabilities and statistics, and network analysis. We teach the Air Force concept of managing men, money, and materiel, and we challenge the students to demonstrate their understanding by participating in case studies of Air Force problems. The management-techniques case study in particular gives the students a chance to integrate the techniques they have studied so as to "game" a weapon system decision. The students can compare their results with the actual Air Force decision, since the case study is based on an existing weapon system.

Some things have remained the same over the years. We still attempt to make every graduate a more effective communicator by requiring him to write and speak in "real world" service situations. Every student must complete nine writing assignments directly related to the needs of the Air Force—letters, OER's, message rewrites, etc. We teach a standardized approach to the art of writing which stresses clarity, conciseness, and directness. Some students improve greatly, some improve only slightly, and some need to improve very little; but they are all more effective writers when they leave. So too are the students more effective speakers when they leave. The speech program, which emphasizes formal and informal briefings, prepares the sos student to operate effectively in the day-to-day working environment of the briefing scene. Group discus-

sions and logical-thinking exercises are still other means of improving communicative skills, and these are heavily emphasized at sos. Through the annual surveys, commanders of our alumni have reported that sos graduates write better, speak better, and are more effective communicators than junior officers who have not taken the sos course. Improved effectiveness in communication seems to be the most readily discernible characteristic of the sos graduate.

It was once believed that leadership traits are inborn, but now we know that leadership can be taught and learned. We use small groups of 12 to 14 men in seminar workshops so that each man can see, feel, and try the principles, attributes, and techniques of leadership which we teach. Each student's leadership ability is described to him by both his peers and the faculty so that he can better understand his potential and his limitations. We encourage the students to try new leadership techniques. Some succeed, some fail, but all learn from their efforts. Human relations, the foundation of leadership, is taught from the lecture platform, in the seminar rooms, and on the athletic field. Some of our students are effective leaders when they arrive at sos; most are more effective leaders when they leave. A small percentage of our students find that other people are just not responsive to their style of leadership. These students are also given descriptive feedback about their leadership efforts, which gives them a better idea of their abilities and shortcomings. Difficulties which he encounters at sos, early in his career, can motivate the officer either to master the techniques of leadership or, in some exceptional cases, to look for another career. In either case the Air Force, the country, and the individual will benefit by the experience. It is a much-needed benefit.

The world has changed rapidly and significantly during the last twenty years. A veritable explosion of information has increased the visibility of international affairs, and it has

cast a spotlight on the military. Fully 10 percent of our curriculum is devoted to examining the world, the nation, and the military system. sos is the only opportunity 75 percent of our students will have to learn the why, what, and how of national power, international relations, and ideological conflict. Our graduates have a better understanding of the world and their role in it. Our curriculum does not certify the sos graduate as an expert in international relations, but he is able to explain to others, and to himself, why the Air Force and the nation are involved in the arena of international politics.

In summary, the graduate of sos is a more effective communicator, a somewhat improved leader, a trained manager, and a more knowledgeable military officer. You have sent us a fine young officer, and we have returned to you a better-informed, more capable man. Perhaps that statement suggests my answer to two of my original questions: "What is the matter with today's junior officers?" and "What are we teaching these kids?" We at Squadron Officer School are convinced that there is nothing the matter with today's officers or with what we are teaching them. Having told you what *we* do to make him more effective, I would like to consider what senior officers generally can do to make our junior officers more effective.

IT HAS BEEN popular during recent years to characterize the differences between generations as a gap. The very word "gap" makes one envision a clear break, a bottomless chasm across which we must build bridges to communicate.

I believe that there is no such thing as a "generation gap." Yet, I also believe that I am different from the junior officers I encounter. They do push against the system, they wear different clothes, they demand a challenging task, and they think more of the fu-

ture than of the past. They are different from me *now*, but they are not so different from what I was when I was their age. I wore different clothes, I pressed the limits of the system, I demanded a challenging task, and I thought more of the future than the past.

Stop and think about yourself when you were a junior officer. If you're from my year group, you participated in a war and were present at the beginning of our Air Force. We had challenging tasks, and we had boring ones. We surely looked and acted different than our seniors. We groused about an army that was rooted in the past and couldn't see the future as clearly as we. Thus it seems that junior officers are not such strange animals as we previously believed. They are really a mirror that lets us look back into our past, and, believe me, we are a lens that lets them look into the future. Though we and they see through the glass but darkly, I hope that by telling of some things we have observed at Squadron Officer School, I may help clarify your image of the junior officer and also his image of you.

General James Ferguson, former Commander of the Air Force Systems Command, once said, particularly for the benefit of other general officers and colonels, that

. . . if our junior officers have a problem, then we have a problem. And it may very well be our predominant problem: in a very meaningful sense, these young officers are our responsibility, and we have a strong obligation to the Air Force for their training and development. Because, sooner than we like to think, they are going to be the Air Force. . . . To develop this new Air Force generation, then, requires that we communicate very seriously with those who are junior to us. We've got to find out what they're thinking and feeling—and why.

At sos, we have tried to find out what they're thinking, and we have asked them "Why?"

Since we get an excellent cross section of



Air Force junior officers three times a year, it seemed logical that sos could provide useful information on the career motivation of junior officers. In order to tap the talent and experience of each class, I asked the school staff to develop the Career Motivation Program. The program, which began in June 1969, continues in-being today.

The sos Career Motivation Program consists of a council of faculty members which studies each class, using questionnaires and seminar discussions. The results to date have benefitted sos and the Air Force. The data collected here have been provided to the Military Personnel Center and members of the staff at Headquarters USAF.

The survey results indicate that sos students are career-oriented and satisfied with their jobs; that they like Air Force people and enjoy the travel opportunities which the Air Force provides. The survey results also show that junior officers are dissatisfied with poor leadership, bureaucratic inflexibility, and assignment uncertainty. The seminar discussions provided further support of these conclusions and allowed the students to further define areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

During the Career Motivation Seminars the students have indicated that their jobs allowed them to be creative, make decisions, and meet challenges. Both they and their wives are pleased with Air Force life in general and with Air Force people in particular. Our students tell us that they desire better leadership, a better rating system, and more career progression visibility. These results support to some degree the contention of Dr. David Whitsett, management consultant and provocative lecturer in the management area, who contends that the Air Force must provide interesting, challenging, and satisfying jobs if it desires to retain and motivate its junior officers. The students consider the quality of their jobs—not security, pay, or fringe benefits—to be of prime importance. They are quick to point out, however, that the latter items

Physical conditioning is one part of the whole man concept at Squadron Officer School. . . . Team sports provide the opportunity for practical application of leadership principles.



could become important factors if their needs for security went unsatisfied. To quote Lieutenant General R. J. Dixon, Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel: ". . . they insist on satisfying, self-fulfilling jobs."

One of the most satisfying "spin-offs" of our seminar program has been the junior/senior officer interface. Since the inception of our seminars we have invited Air War College (AWC) students and Air University (AU) senior officers to participate with our students and faculty. The exchange of ideas between junior and senior officers has been a revelation to both groups. The students have been favorably impressed with the open-minded, sincere interest displayed by their leaders, and the senior officers have been impressed with the quality and depth of today's junior officers. One AU general officer enjoyed the exchange so much that he expressed a desire to return later for more discussion with his seminar. Another senior officer said the seminar was ". . . the most refreshing and rewarding experience of my career. I want to come back again!"

We intend to have those senior officers back again as we continue to search out answers to the questions, "What motivates or demotivates junior officers, and why?" I would suggest that you, as commanders and leaders of junior officers, use a direct "face-to-face" communication channel such as we have used. I have noted during the past few years that

our students pick as their most effective leaders those officers who actively seek out personal contacts with the young officers. Try our approach. I think that both you and your subordinates will benefit from it.

AS THE COMMANDANT of an Air University school, I assure you that I don't propose to tell you how to run your organization. Such an attempt would be presumptuous, but I feel that here at sos we have practiced some techniques and approaches that have worked for us, and I want you to know what they are. Why? Because you, as a

group, have an opportunity to affect a great many more officers for a longer period of time than we can with our limited enrollment and short-duration course. I hope you will consider these suggestions, adapt them to your own particular needs, and accrue the benefits I believe will result.

Here at sos we challenge our students both mentally and physically. We tell our students that very few of them will fail the course and very few of them will be distinguished graduates. We tell them that, for most of them, the real reward they will gain will be satisfaction—satisfaction for having tested and exceeded what they had thought were mental and physical barriers. For example, we tell our students



Wives of students and faculty get involved in SOS activities.

what effective writing and speaking should be, and then we let them apply what we have taught them. We compare their performance against an unwavering standard of excellence. We know some students have more ability than others, and we know some may never reach the highest level of communicative ability. We have found that by demanding excellence from all our students, every student improves—the best improve a little, the average improve much more, and the weak improve the most.

Our students—your junior officers—don't rebel against the criticism we give their efforts; they welcome it. Students have complained that they have not been critiqued enough, rather than too much. We have found that students oftentimes grade their writing and speaking assignments lower than the instructor would have. How do we manage to convince the student to seek out criticism and develop the ability to criticize himself? It's relatively simple. We let him know we are trying to *help* him be a more effective officer. We don't criticize only what the student did wrong; we tell him what he did right, *and* how he can correct his mistakes. We have found over the years that our students are constantly searching for an honest, constructive evaluation of their ability. Often they tell us that this is the first time during their career that someone tried to help them improve.

I personally feel that many of you have tried to help junior officers improve, but perhaps because of the manner in which advice or criticism was offered, it was not recognized or accepted. Ask yourself, "Have I made certain my subordinates understood that I was trying to make them a better officer, pilot, missileman, etc.?" You can't assume that your subordinates know this, but you can assume that, if they know you care about them as individuals, they will outperform any standards you have set. You are probably asking yourself, "How can I convince my subordi-

nates I'm trying to help them?" We have found some techniques very effective. I hope they can work for you.

Here at sos we work hard at learning everything we can about our students. They turn in an autobiography the first day they arrive here at the school. We read these autobiographies to evaluate each student's writing ability, and, more important, to learn as much as we can about his background. We memorize all the students' names so that when we first meet we can address them by name. The work involved is worth it when on the first day of class a student freezes in the hall as a faculty member passes him and says, "Good morning, Dave." It is only a small gesture, but it helps us let the students know that we respect them as individuals.

Learning the names of hundreds of students is only half the problem; we also try to make their wives feel welcome, too. We insist that our section commanders be married because their wives play an important role in bringing the wives of students into the school activities. Every section, wing, and division at sos makes sure that the student wives are welcomed, considered, and challenged during their brief stay at sos. During the first weeks of school the wives attend formal and informal receptions and coffees. Members of the faculty prepare a two-hour presentation on sos activities so that the wives can better understand what their husbands are going to be doing during the next 14 weeks. Throughout the course, evenings are set aside to brief the wives on the Air Force medical, personnel, and promotion systems. Most of the wives report that this is the first time they have received this kind of briefing. The wives also plan and conduct luncheons, with the assistance of wives of the faculty. The wives in every section make colorful outfits to wear to sports functions, where they join in the evaluation process by "critiquing" their husbands, the other team, and the referees.

We believe that an officer's wife can be the



Seminars give students an opportunity for discussion of practical approaches to problem situations. . . . They learn a systematic approach to problem solving. . . . Polifka Auditorium, scene of lectures by assigned faculty and renowned guests, takes on an air of relaxed informality during a break.





Students discuss various solutions to a problem that arises in task George's Gorge of Project X. . . . How to cross the missing span with limited equipment and time calls for ingenuity during task Space Bridge. . . . The execution of one solution to task River Cry reveals its degree of practicality.



Mastery of effective techniques for unarmed combat is one of SOS graduates' accomplishments.

deciding factor in his decision to make the Air Force a career. We try to let the girls know we care, and I believe they do care when on graduation day they leave with a smile on their faces and tears in their eyes. If we can establish close bonds in 14 weeks, I am sure that you and your wives can do much more during the years an officer is under your command. With all the emphasis on an all-volunteer force, we sometimes forget that perhaps the most important thing we can do to keep our people costs us nothing except time.

One other thing we have found is that young officers respect the U.S. Air Force and desire to learn more about its history. We have a program to tell them some of the things their chosen service has done. One of the most popular voluntary programs in our curriculum is the lunch-hour film series, during which we show the students what happened at Ploesti, Korea, and Vietnam. We show films about great military leaders, hoping that our students can learn from their successes and failures. We are proud of our Air

Force, and we let it show. We are also proud of our heritage, and we let that show too. The fact that young officers are interested in our heritage can be best understood when you see a student gazing at a "wall of heroes" that has on it the picture and story of every USAF Medal of Honor winner. These officers admire you for what you have done. There is no "generation gap" when a 25-year-old student watches a 25-year-old film showing a 25-year-old pilot strapping on a "jug" (P-47). These men are standing now where you stood then, and they want and need your help to stand some day where you stand now.


Give your people help by teaching them to help themselves. Don't tell them exactly how everything is to be done. Let them try to solve their own problems. When you give a man a task, don't answer his questions on how to do it. Instead, ask him questions that will enable him to find the right answer. We have found that if we tell a man what to do, he learns how well we understand the problem. On the other hand, if we ask probing questions, the man learns how well *he* understands the prob-

lem. The latter course sometimes takes longer and does not solve the problem as efficiently as the former, but it helps the man become more effective, and in today's Air Force any other course is second-best.

It is not easy to turn away from a situation where you know exactly what should be done. It is not easy here at SOS in the seminar room or on the athletic field; and I know from personal experience that it is more difficult in an operational situation where you are responsible for accomplishing the mission. Remember, your job is similar to that of an instructor pilot who must constantly expose himself to a student pilot's mistakes if that student is ever going to learn to fly.

The most effective leaders in the history of the Air Force have made their subordinates lead. You and I are where we are today because our seniors gave us opportunities to succeed or to fail. Give your young officers these same opportunities. You won't be disappointed and they will welcome the challenge.

Squadron Officer School



THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON THE CAMBODIAN OPERATION

*A Case Study in
Crisis Management*

COLONEL RUSSELL H. SMITH

ON THE NIGHT of 30 April 1970, President Nixon announced over nationwide television his decision to commit American forces to ground combat in neutral Cambodia. Coming as a complete surprise to most Americans, including such seasoned and knowledgeable observers of the Washington scene as Stewart Alsop,¹ this decision appeared to many to be a breach of faith by a President who only ten days earlier had announced plans to withdraw 150,000 men from the unpopular Vietnam war. Editorial comment was prompt and generally bitter. The *New York Times* accused the President of “. . . escalating a war from which he had promised to disengage.”² And the *Washington Post* leveled at the Chief Executive charges of “. . . artful dissembling . . . suspect evidence, specious argument and excessive rhetoric.”³

Nor was opposition to the President's move confined to editorial comment. College campuses throughout the nation erupted in violent protest, culminating in the tragic slaying of four students at Kent State College in Ohio by National Guardsmen called out to preserve order. Congressional reaction was bitter and unrestrained, the chief complaint being that Congress had not been consulted before the President initiated the Cambodian operation. Writing in the June issue of *Fortune* magazine, editor Max Ways expressed the deeply felt misgivings of many Nixon supporters over the apparent rent in the fabric of American society caused by the President's action:

Cambodia pulled the plug. It may ultimately be shown that Nixon had excellent military reasons for sending U.S. units into Cambodia. But Cambodia was not his main problem. The condition of the U.S. was his main problem. When he encased his announcement on Cambodia in the kind of simplistic and emotional language most likely to inflame antiwar dissidents, including the moderates, he invited a greater cost in American unity than could possibly be balanced by any success in Indochina.⁴

What lay behind these charges? Had the President in fact broken faith with the nation in some fantastic effort to achieve a military victory, whatever the cost? What events led to the crisis situation which faced the President as he wrestled with his difficult decision? And what motivation could cause a skilled politician to risk doing irreparable damage to himself and to his political party during an election year? Attempts to answer these and similar questions form the basis of this article on political-military crisis management.

On 18 March 1970 one of the longest tight-rope acts of history ended when Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted as Chief of State of the ostensibly neutral nation of Cambodia. Sihanouk's ouster came as he was leaving Moscow for Peking to continue his appeals for help in persuading North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to withdraw from Cambodia. The coup, as a result of which the Premier, General Lon Nol, became the *de facto* head of the Cambodian government, climaxed two weeks of demonstrations against the presence of an estimated 35,000 to 60,000 Communist troops, located principally in areas of eastern Cambodia adjacent to South Vietnam.

On 23 March Prince Sihanouk announced over Peking radio his intention to form a national liberation army to “free” Cambodia. Two days later, pledging support to Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong broke diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh. Simultaneously, the Russians warned that any change in Cambodia's neutralist policy would have very grave consequences and accused the United States of seeking to extend the Southeast Asian war to Cambodia.

During the following weeks sporadic fighting occurred throughout most of Cambodia between Communist forces and the poorly trained and inadequately equipped Cambodian army of some 35,000 men. On 14 April, with the situation steadily deteriorating, Lon Nol asked that friendly governments supply

arms to Cambodia. Despite captured arms supplied from South Vietnam, during the next two weeks Communist pressure continued throughout the embattled nation. On 29 April, with U.S. air and logistic support, South Vietnamese forces attacked Communist forces just across the border in the "parrot's beak" area of Cambodia.

Elements of the Crisis

The situation which faced the President and his advisers during the final days of April was thus one of mounting crisis. Sihanouk's ouster had come as a complete surprise to the President.⁵ His efforts to disengage American forces through the process of "Vietnamizing" the war were proceeding on schedule. Although Communist use of Cambodian sanctuaries had been a persistent military problem, Sihanouk, prodded by increasing pressure from his people, had seemed, prior to his ouster, determined to force a reduction of the Communist presence in his country.⁶ The strife and turmoil that followed the March coup in Cambodia thus created an entirely new situation and threatened the precarious stability of all of Indochina. In addition to military considerations, the resulting crisis contained elements of domestic and international political importance.

military factors

Communist use of sanctuaries in support of "wars of national liberation" has become a familiar tactic in the years since World War II. In fact, as one military analyst notes, "Almost all the successful or viciously stubborn insurgencies of this century have depended on some form of sanctuary strategy."⁷ During the early phases of the Vietnamese conflict, the Viet Cong were strong enough to maintain widespread supply caches and assembly areas

within South Vietnam. But as the strength of the South Vietnamese Army grew with U.S. military and logistic aid, the Communists found it necessary to move their supply points and assembly areas across the border to the sanctuary of adjacent Cambodian territory. The bulk of the Communist installations were located in the "fishhook" and "parrot's beak" salients. The latter area is only some 35 miles from Saigon. From the relative security of these sanctuaries, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were able to mount periodic forays across the border into the III Corps area of South Vietnam.

Following Sihanouk's ouster, the Cambodian government denied use of the port of Sihanoukville to the Communist forces.⁸ Thus forced to depend exclusively for replacement and resupply on the long overland route from North Vietnam down through Laos to their sanctuaries, the Communists immediately began moving to ensure the safety of this supply route by effectively consolidating and expanding their separate pockets of strength throughout eastern Cambodia. As the President pointed out in his report on 30 June, "The prospect suddenly loomed of Cambodia's becoming virtually one large base area for attack anywhere into South Vietnam along the 600 miles of the Cambodian frontier."⁹

In addition to posing an increased threat to Vietnamization efforts in South Vietnam, the Communist expansion in eastern Cambodia threatened the very existence of the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia. If the Lon Nol government fell to Communist pressure, according to military experts in Saigon, the immediate outcome would be the reopening of Cambodian supply routes, including the port of Sihanoukville, to the Communists, as well as unobstructed access to the vastly enlarged border sanctuaries.¹⁰ Thus even the restoration of a government under the deposed Sihanouk clearly precluded re-establishment of the status quo.

domestic political factors

Although purely military considerations seemed clearly to indicate the advisability of taking some action against the Communist forces in Cambodia, political considerations springing from the troubled domestic scene counseled caution. Apparently satisfied with the progress of Vietnamization, the President on 20 April 1970 had announced plans to withdraw 150,000 more American fighting men from Vietnam by midsummer of 1971. The nation's campuses, following sporadic flare-ups during the late winter and early spring, seemed to be returning to a measure of calm. Throughout the land, many citizens viewed with satisfaction the President's apparent success in "winding down" the war, as the weekly casualty figures continued to decline.

The domestic political climate was thus obviously not one favorable to any increase in American military commitment in Southeast Asia. A stubborn inflation and a worrisome unemployment rate, both widely attributed at least indirectly to the Vietnamese involvement, were of considerable concern to the administration, the Congress, and the public at large. The President's policy advisers were optimistic that the nation's economic ills could be cured, but part of the prescription was the admonition that the patient remain calm and unperturbed. A major divisive event was clearly not desirable.

international political factors

Any nation contemplating the use of military force in a crisis situation cannot fail to consider the international repercussions of its proposed action. Adroit handling of the situation in the United Nations and other international forums during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has been generally credited with winning widespread approval for the U.S. position. Yet the advisability of seeking prior approval for one's contemplated actions must be carefully weighed against the loss of the element

of surprise resulting from prior consultation.

A nation engaged in overt hostilities presumably retains a certain degree of freedom in the actions deemed necessary to protect its forces. Yet any action taken which widens the area of conflict or threatens to cause additional powers to join in combat is certainly a matter of international concern. It goes without saying that if the new combatant should be a nuclear power, the concern would mount exponentially.

Resolution of the Crisis

Any effort to reconstruct in detail the thought processes by which the President and his advisers arrived at their decisions on the Cambodian affair is hampered by a lack of first-person accounts. Most of the principals have been naturally reluctant to divulge their attitudes and advice given to the President. He has revealed some of the options he was considering during the last ten days of April, both in his prepared statements on the decision and in answer to questions at press conferences. But the most extensive descriptions of the deliberations have appeared in a very limited number of accounts compiled after the fact from discussions with the principals or members of their staffs. Until recently, at least, the most exhaustive and detailed of these appears to be the article prepared by David R. Maxey for the August 11 issue of *Look* magazine. The ensuing discussion of the President's crisis decision is based on information gleaned from all the aforementioned sources.

In assessing the military considerations, the President naturally leaned heavily on the advice of his military advisers, principally the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the members of the National Security Council (NSC). In his televised speech to the nation on 30 April, the President stated that his decision had been reached after ". . . full consultation with the

National Security Council, Ambassador [to South Vietnam] Bunker, General Abrams [commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam] and . . . [his] other advisers . . .”¹¹ According to the President, the existing military situation permitted three options: (1) to “do nothing,” (2) “to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia,” or (3) “to go to the heart of the trouble” by “cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong occupied sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.”¹² Maxey reports that the NSC meeting of 22 April convinced the President that the expansion of the Cambodian sanctuaries “gave the enemy an increased capability of inflicting casualties on U.S. troops in South Vietnam at almost any level they chose” and, further, that the “poor state of training” of the Cambodian army would preclude the effective use of a “massive infusion of U.S. arms aid even if the Administration wanted to send it.”¹³

With the feasibility of the first two options thus placed in serious doubt, attention was focused on means of accomplishing the third option—a military move from South Vietnam against the sanctuaries. According to Maxey’s account, the NSC consensus at the 22 April meeting was in favor of a South Vietnamese operation with U.S. air support.¹⁴ Limited operations against Cambodian sanctuaries had occasionally been reported over the preceding two years, with at least tacit Cambodian approval.¹⁵ And on 29 March a battalion-size strike against the sanctuaries by South Vietnamese rangers, supported by American helicopter gunships, had been reported by the *New York Times*.¹⁶ Thus there was ample precedent for at least a South Vietnamese incursion against the sanctuaries. It is also probable that a South Vietnamese operation, even one with U.S. air and logistic support, would have proved much more palatable domestically than an operation calling for the employment of U.S. ground forces. Following

the NSC meeting, the President ordered detailed planning for a South Vietnamese strike against sanctuaries in the “parrot’s beak” area of Cambodia, 35 miles west of Saigon.¹⁷

The possibility of using U.S. forces in conjunction with the South Vietnamese strike, originally proposed at the 22 April NSC meeting, apparently continued to weigh heavily on the President’s mind. Besides the Communist forces in the “parrot’s beak” area, another of their major concentrations was in the “fishhook” area. Reportedly, it contained vast caches of materiel and supplies and was also headquarters for the entire Communist operation, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The military advantages of a successful two-pronged thrust to overrun both areas simultaneously were obvious. In addition to the expectation of capturing much greater quantities of weapons and supplies and the hope of disrupting the enemy command and control structure, the “fishhook” operation would deny the enemy the capability of mounting a flanking attack against the single South Vietnamese thrust into the “parrot’s beak.” But American forces occupied the area adjacent to the “fishhook.” Considerations of timing and tactical warning clearly precluded any major realignment of forces to permit the South Vietnamese to conduct both operations. It was therefore clear that if a thrust against the “fishhook” were to be conducted in conjunction with the “parrot’s beak” operation, it would have to be performed by U.S. ground forces.

Aside from purely military considerations, a decision to use U.S. ground forces was understood by all concerned to pose far graver domestic political issues than would a purely Vietnamese operation. Even as military planning commenced for a U.S. operation against the “fishhook,” acting on the President’s orders Dr. Henry Kissinger discussed with a “senior senator” probable Congressional reaction to such a move. In addition, Kissinger is reported to have discussed public reaction with

certain members of his staff, who generally felt that

. . . incursions, particularly if they involved American troops, would be a serious escalation of the war, that the domestic response would be explosive, and that the expected results, in terms of enemy supplies captured, would not be worth the risk.¹⁸

Extended discussion of the proposed "fish-hook" operation, centering on the domestic uproar that it was expected to evoke, took place at another NSC meeting on 26 April. At the conclusion of this meeting the President had apparently still not reached a decision.¹⁹

On the following day the President had Dr. Kissinger check with another senator to assess Congressional reaction. One adviser is reported to have warned the President that an American incursion into Cambodia would cause the campuses to "go up in flames." To this the President reportedly replied, "If I decide to do it, it will be because I have decided to pay the price."²⁰

Although international political considerations in this instance appear to have been less critical than in most crises, the probable reactions of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and our own allies were discussed by the President and Dr. Kissinger. Additionally, the possibility of U.S. action in Cambodia was the subject of discussion by Japanese and U.S. academicians at a meeting attended by Dr. Kissinger on the evening of 27 April.²¹

The weight assigned the facts and opinions gathered from this wide spectrum of sources remains locked in the heart and mind of Richard M. Nixon. By the morning of 28 April he had reached his fateful decision, which was duly conveyed to his closest advisers.²² Planning for the execution of the operation, for the method of its announcement, and for measures to increase public acceptance occupied the President and his advisers up to the moment he appeared before the nation's television viewers on 30 April. True to the pledge made to a dissenting aide, in his speech and

subsequent statements the President assumed full responsibility for his decision and all its consequences.

Analysis of the Decision

Objections to the President's decision generally fall into the same categories of analysis as did the considerations which led to the decision: military objections, domestic political objections, and international political objections.

military objections

Criticism of the President's move based on purely military considerations quickly appeared from a number of sources. Most of the critics flatly rejected the President's contention that the move had been necessitated by the Communists' expansion of their sanctuary areas. A *Newsweek* writer considered the danger "at most, remote."²³ A number of commentators pounced on the apparent disparity between the President's statement on 20 April that things were going so well that he could withdraw 150,000 troops and the requirement ten days later to expand the American effort. Writing in the *New Republic*, Hans Morgenthau opined that the requirement to use U.S. forces proved that Vietnamization was a failure.²⁴ Almost to a man, the critics averred that far from being a response to Communist activities, the move was merely the result of the President's acceding to demands long expressed by the military that they be allowed to "clean out" the sanctuaries. Sihanouk's ouster and the subsequent turmoil merely served as the pretext for the long-sought "military victory."²⁵

From the administration's point of view, subsequent events proved most of the criticism to be completely invalid. The operation was seen as an almost unparalleled military success. In particular, the performance of the South Vietnamese in most instances exceeded

the most optimistic expectations of their American advisers. At the conclusion of the operation on 30 June, President Nixon was able to report to the nation that complete success had been achieved in securing the aims of saving allied lives, assuring the withdrawal of American forces on schedule, enabling Vietnamization to continue as planned, and enhancing the prospects of peace.²⁶

domestic political objections

If most of the military objections seemed laid to rest by the claimed success of the operation, several of the domestic political objections proved more deep-seated and enduring. One of the immediate effects of the President's decision was to focus renewed attention on the Constitutional question of the extent of the President's authority in committing American forces to combat without consulting Congress. The *New Yorker* editorialized that "the war in Cambodia was not an emergency. There was time enough to present the matter to Congress for a swift decision."²⁷ When subsequently questioned on his reasons for failing to consult Congress prior to his decision, the President justified his action on the requirement to protect American fighting men's lives. He then observed that the Senate had spent seven weeks debating the Cooper-Church amendment before final action; the need for quick action and strategic surprise, in his view, precluded prior official notification of Congress.²⁸

A second broad area of criticism of the President centered on the use (or misuse) he made of his advisers in arriving at his decision. Writing in the *New York Times*, Robert Semple charged: "The careful decision-making process of the N. S. C. on which the President has normally relied was largely bypassed, as were lower-echelon experts in the Cabinet departments."²⁹ Several critics commented on the prominent role played by the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). The Presi-

dent had formally announced the existence of this body, created for the express purpose of crisis management, in his Report to the Congress of 18 February 1970. He outlined the function of the group as follows:

. . . This group drafts contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. . . . While no one can anticipate exactly the timing and course of a possible crisis, the WSAG's planning helps insure that we have asked the right questions in advance, and thought through the implications of various responses.³⁰

From all accounts, in the Cambodian crisis WSAG functioned precisely in this manner under the direction of Dr. Kissinger, drawing up contingency plans at the President's direction. Their function was limited exclusively to planning. When questioned at a news conference on 8 May about the influence of others upon his decision, the President made his position quite clear:

. . . after hearing all of their advice, I made the decision. Decisions, of course, are not made by vote in the National Security Council or in the Cabinet. They are made by the President with the advice of those, and I made this decision. I take the responsibility for it. I believe it was the right decision. I believe it will work out. If it doesn't, then I am to blame. They are not.³¹

Notwithstanding the President's avowal that he had fully appreciated the extent and the degree of public reaction to his decision, many critics of the decision doubted that this was the case. *Newsweek* commented that ". . . the President had gambled his own fortunes—and those of his party and his nation—on tactics that were perilously unsure of success."³² Republican leaders were gloomily predicting the destruction of their party, while Democrats fumed and vowed vengeance. Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson confessed that the degree of reaction had been more intense than he personally had expected.³³ But Secretary of State William

Rogers reported that a White House poll showed that the American public supported the President's action three to one.³⁴ It is perhaps significant that in the 3 November elections the Republican Party seemed to suffer none of the drastic reversals forecast by some political analysts six months earlier.

international political objections

If certain domestic political objections to the President's decision remain unresolved, much more so is it the case with international political objections. One common objection was that the Cambodian adventure would surely wreck any chance for a negotiated peace. Against this objection, Under Secretary Richardson proposed the contrary view that weakening the Communists' logistic base would provide them with an inducement to negotiate that was previously lacking.³⁵

One of the most recurrent objections was the charge that the President's action failed to consider the fate of the Cambodians. Several critics noted the long-standing enmity between the Cambodians and their Thai and Vietnamese neighbors. An editorial in the *New Republic* somberly observed that "the prospects for Cambodia seem to be either perpetual internal strife . . . or Cambodia being partitioned between Thailand and Vietnam, the fate the Cambodians have always dreaded."³⁶ That traditional Cambodian-Vietnamese enmity did result in excesses on both sides both before and during the operation cannot be denied. Nor is it at all certain that the Lon Nol government could successfully resist, without ex-

tensive outside support, a determined Communist effort to capture virtually all of Cambodia.

Any answer to charges of indifference to the fate of Cambodia must be sought within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. For it is within the context of that doctrine that the entire American policy in Southeast Asia is being pursued. As Vietnamization steadily progresses, the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia will steadily decline. At his news conference of 13 May, Secretary of State Rogers expressed the U.S. position very clearly when he said, ". . . the United States has no intention of getting involved in Cambodia with American troops in support of the present government of Cambodia or any other government of Cambodia."³⁷

In his report to the nation on the Cambodian operation, President Nixon discussed at some length the future of Cambodia. He noted, first, that in accordance with his foreign policy guidelines laid down on Guam, the Cambodians would be expected to exert maximum efforts in their own self-defense. Second, he pointed out that we encourage regional associations for mutual defense. And finally, he specified that we will assist nations and regional organizations only when our participation can make a difference.³⁸ *Time* magazine summarized the situation succinctly in noting that Cambodia was ". . . destined to become the first test for the Nixon Doctrine, which encourages Asians to solve Asia's problems."³⁹

Air War College

Notes

1. Stewart Alsop, "The Timing of the Gamble," *Newsweek*, Vol. 75, May 11, 1970, p. 112.

2. "Military Hallucination—Again," editorial, *New York Times*, May 1, 1970, p. 34.

3. "Vietnam: Mr. Nixon's Quick Fix . . ." editorial, *Washington Post*, May 2, 1970, p. A12.

4. Max Ways, "The President Needs Our Help Because We Need His," *Fortune*, Vol. 81, June 1970, p. 58.

5. "President Nixon's White Paper on Cambodia," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 69, July 13, 1970, p. 83.

6. Stanley Karnow, "Cambodia May Pose Dilemma for Nixon's Asian Policy," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1970, p. A19.

7. Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., "The Problem of Guerrilla Sanctuaries," *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 107, April 18, 1970, p. 12.

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URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA

Its Implications for the Future

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IN SEVERAL areas of Latin America, one of the most interesting developments in recent years has been the steady movement of insurgent forces from a rural to an urban environment. Whether nationalist or Marxist in ideology, these guerrilla elements appear to have abandoned serious efforts to create insurgent bases in the countryside. Rejecting the dictates of leading guerrilla theoreticians such as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and Régis Debray—all of whom urged the creation of rural-based guerrilla cadres—many insurgents of the late 1960s and early 1970s have opted more and more for urban terrorism. Instead of a rural guerrilla force capable of expanding and, in the words of Mao, ultimately "surrounding the cities," present-day insurgents have reversed the sequence of events. Operations are now initiated and developed within a nation's urban areas, turning these and not the countryside into the real focus of any revolutionary activity.

As an interesting by-product of this strategic change, the peasantry, traditionally considered the backbone of any guerrilla movement, has been largely discarded in favor of urban-dwelling, politically conscious, and Marxist-influenced middle-class students and intellectuals. This tendency seems clear from the experiences in many Latin American states over the past five years, and there is no indication of any change. Thus it would appear useful to consider why a strategy so radically different from the traditional guerrilla strategy should have been adopted, whether it may be expected to continue into the future, and the impact it may have on currently accepted tactics and techniques for countering insurgent operations.

The change to an urban focus appears attributable to a combination of factors. Primary among these are an increasingly sparse rural population resulting from continued and accelerated urbanization; the presence in most metropolitan areas of a growing, articulate,

and quickly aroused cadre of students and young intellectuals willing to embrace terrorism and urban insurgency as the most effective means for toppling governments they consider corrupt and ineffective; the nonadaptability to urbanized societies of guerrilla tactics created, designed, and tested for use among a dense rural population; and the conspicuous failure of recent rural-based efforts at guerrilla warfare and the significant success achieved by urban terrorist groups.

While urbanization has long characterized many nations of Latin America,¹ within recent years this trend has accelerated. Rural dwellers formerly willing to remain part of an often semifeudal agrarian society are now being drawn to the urban areas in increasing numbers. Products of the so-called "transistor revolution," these people have become aware of the possibility for a better life in the cities. Attracted by the prospects of employment, improved living conditions, and the opportunity to create a better life for their children, many migrants from rural areas see the cities as a means of escape from the grinding poverty of the Latin American countryside.² Further stimulating this rural-to-urban population flow is a land tenure system which vests 90 percent of all arable land in the hands of less than 10 percent of the people.³ Denied any real possibility of owning land and often tied to a large landholder through the system of debt peonage, many rural dwellers take the first available opportunity to migrate toward the city. When these pressures are combined with the area's generally inhospitable rural geography (tropical jungle, arid upland plains, mountains, etc.), the net result is an underpopulated countryside (often with less than two or three persons per square kilometer) and overpopulated urban centers.⁴

Today Latin America as a whole is more than 50 percent urban. Many nations (for example, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela) have metropolitan populations ranging from 57 to 70 percent of the

national total.⁵ In some countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) one or two cities alone account for 42 to 47 percent of the total population.⁶ Within highly urbanized nations such as these, rural-based insurgency stands relatively little chance of success, simply because the countryside lacks the population base to support it. Whether would-be insurgents follow the precepts of Mao, wherein guerrillas supposedly merge with the peasantry, or support the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis, in which a mobile guerrilla "foco" rejects close ties with any peasant group,⁷ both schools of insurgency theory look ultimately to the rural populace as a prime source of recruits and logistic support. In the sparsely populated Latin American countryside, assistance of this type simply is not available. The plaintive comments of Guevara in his now famous diary, covering the 1966-67 Cuban-backed insurgent effort in Bolivia, testify clearly to the critical nature of this support.

In this same context, as is evident from the experiences of insurgent leaders in many Latin American countries, including Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia, the rural population is sparse and primarily Indian in ethnic background. Innately conservative and extremely suspicious of any influences from outside the local community, these Indian peasants are often an extremely difficult group for the guerrillas to influence and motivate. The sudden appearance of numerous armed strangers in their midst frequently leads to peasant notification of local authorities. Thus, the ultimate result of efforts to influence these peasants is often the arrival of governmental counterinsurgency forces rather than the creation of support for the insurgent cadre.

Closely correlated with the urbanization trend is a concentration of radical student and intellectual elements within most metropolitan centers. Latin American cities, traditionally the focus of education and intellectual activity, today contain the major universities, most

of the literate citizenry, and the vast majority of the student population.⁸ Educated primarily in the law, humanities, and medicine, the students frequently have difficulty integrating into a society that needs technicians, engineers, and skilled artisans. These students, the product of a university system still strongly influenced by Marxist economic and political doctrine, form a highly articulate and volatile group. When their political radicalism and desire for needed social change are coupled with frequent governmental lethargy and inactivity, they become ideal targets for recruitment into revolutionary groups. Often students see organizations like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR) in Brazil, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) in Venezuela, and the Liberation Armed Forces in Argentina as the only effective media for initiating change and eliminating governments they consider corrupt and ineffective.

As the students are mainly from an urban background (at the University of Buenos Aires 76 percent of the students are from the city of Buenos Aires),⁹ they are able to function very effectively within an urban terrorist environment. Familiar with the city and its customs, they meld easily into metropolitan-based insurgent groups; their effective integration into a rural guerrilla organization is substantially more difficult. In this connection, the comments of guerrilla leaders are informative. Guevara states in his diary that the city-bred insurgents joining his forces in Bolivia had to overcome not only the difficult physical adjustments required for survival in the bush but also wide cultural, linguistic, and even class differences between themselves and the peasantry. Similar problems plagued urban-educated members of the FALN in Venezuela, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Peru, and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala.

In addition to functioning more effectively in an urban than in a rural situation, the

students and young intellectuals who form the cadre of most metropolitan insurgent groups find innumerable other advantages in an urban environment. Among the more significant are easy access to

—*terrorist targets*: foreign embassies, diplomatic personnel, local government and police officials, business firms, etc. Recent operations of the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Brazilian VPR illustrate the relative ease with which diplomats can be kidnapped or assaulted and foreign businesses destroyed. In contrast to rural guerrillas who may have little impact upon the central government for some time, kidnapping a diplomat or destroying a foreign business immediately focuses world attention on the insurgents and their demands. Of equal importance is the fact that such acts embarrass the government and undermine public confidence in its ability to provide protection for its citizens and for the important income-producing tourist trade.

—*funds* to support insurgent operations. Readily available for robberies and assaults are banks and foreign business firms. In attacks on these targets the Tupamaro forces alone have netted more than six million dollars.¹⁰ In contrast, the rural guerrilla frequently has to obtain financing through long and often insecure channels.

—*food*. Whereas the rural guerrilla often has to live off the land, as Guevara did in Bolivia, the food source for an urban insurgent is often as close as the nearest local market place.

—*medical* supplies and services. For the rural insurgent, medical supplies are always in short supply. For the urban terrorist, pharmaceuticals are readily available for purchase or theft, and sometimes medical students at local universities provide skilled surgical assistance when needed.

—*arms*. Even in such basic areas as arms procurement, the urban guerrilla has a significant advantage. Whereas the rural insurgent

normally must obtain additional weapons from an enemy killed in combat, or through shipments smuggled into the country from abroad, the cities offer his urban counterpart innumerable opportunities to obtain weapons. When these cannot be purchased openly or through the black market, the urban guerrilla can attack police stations, armories, gun clubs, and similar lucrative targets.

—*intelligence*. In the critical field of intelligence collection, the student-manned urban terrorist organization also is at a substantial advantage over the rural guerrilla. Composed primarily of individuals from middle- or sometimes upper-class families, student groups generally have personal or family connections extending into many echelons of national government. Through these associations and those of friends and supporters, they are often able to obtain quite accurate information on governmental countering operations.¹¹

While urbanization and the ready availability of a radicalized student force in metropolitan areas have been important factors in the movement of insurgent cadres from the countryside to the cities, also significant has been the failure of guerrilla theoreticians to make those tactical and strategic modifications necessary to take advantage of this development. In general, this failure is attributable to an apparent inability on the part of the Castroites (Guevara-Debray) and the Maoists to understand that experiences wholly valid in one geographical and demographic situation may be totally invalid in another. Thus, both the Cuban and Chinese Communist strategies were predicated upon the development of a rural guerrilla movement in a densely populated countryside.¹² By insisting on the development of rural insurgencies and dogmatically applying their experiences to nations with an underpopulated countryside, the Communists have experienced a series of resounding failures ranging from the disastrous Cuban-led guerrilla "invasion" of northern Argentina in 1963 to the breakup of the Cuban-backed

Venezuelan and Guatemalan insurgencies, the failure of the 1965 Maoist and Castroite effort in Peru, and the Cuban fiasco in Bolivia which resulted in Guevara's death.

In connection with these failures, it is interesting to note that, despite vigorous indorsement of rural-based insurgencies by the Communist strategists of both China and Cuba, these two powers split decisively on the overall strategy for implementing such operations. Severely criticizing the inadequate preparations made by Castroites in both Peru and Bolivia, the Chinese have chided the Cubans for failing first to create several secure base areas to support guerrilla operations (a concept integral to Maoist guerrilla philosophy and expressly rejected by Castro, Guevara, and Debray); for failing to give the peasantry sufficient political indoctrination; and for failing to create an effective insurgent support apparatus through a united front of the peasants, workers, and poorer bourgeoisie.¹³

Convinced that their philosophical approach was sound, however, the Cubans devoted little effort to a study of these factors or the basic geographic and demographic situation in which an insurgency was to be created. Rather they continued to insist on the primacy of their concept of rural over urban insurgency and the fact that cities were the deathbed of revolution and could never be its focal point.¹⁴ Nevertheless, as is clear to any observer of the Latin American scene, the opposite is true: rural insurgency has steadily declined, while its urban counterpart continues to grow in scope and intensity.

WITH available evidence indicating a continued increase in city-based terrorism in Latin America, can this trend be expected to continue well into the 1970s? If so, will it require a change in current counter-insurgency techniques, which are now focused largely on operations against rural guerrillas?

The answer to both questions seems to be yes.

Based upon Cuban revolutionary doctrine, which has undergone relatively little change in recent years, guerrilla warfare remains the accepted medium for achieving rapid and lasting social change within the hemisphere. While heretofore those aspects of this doctrine concerned with insurgency have stressed the primacy of rural over urban operations, this position has changed significantly within the past two years. Quite probably this change was generated by a variety of influences, prominent among which must have been (1) the dismal record of Cuban-supported rural insurgent operations over the past ten years; (2) the contrasting success of urban terrorism carried out by radical revolutionary groups; and (3) the recent ascent to power, via the electoral process, of the Allende government in Chile. With the success of Allende's *via pacifica*, which had been a frequent target for Cuban criticism, and the failure of its own rural guerrilla strategy, the Castro regime seems to have reassessed its position of supporting only rural insurgent operations.

One of the first indicators of this reassessment was Cuban endorsement of the urban terror tactics of the FAR in Guatemala, tactics which in 1968 resulted in the death or wounding of several officers assigned to the U.S. Military Advisory Group and later the assassination of U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein. This endorsement of urban terrorism accelerated in 1970 with the publication of Carlos Marighella's "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla" in the January-February issue of *Tricontinental*.¹⁵ As the official organ of the executive secretariat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL), an organization headquartered in Havana and dominated by Cuba, *Tricontinental* purveys the "official" Cuban line of insurgent strategy and warfare. Marighella, a dissident former member of the Brazilian Communist Party and founder of the urban terrorist National Liber-

ating Action (ALN), was well known for his opposition to the Cuban thesis of rural guerrilla warfare. Accordingly, the printing of Marighella's "Mini-Manual" in *Tricontinental* constitutes a substantial change in Cuban thinking as well as an official public blessing and endorsement of the new tactics. Further, since the "Mini-Manual" now serves as the urban terrorist's equivalent of Guevara's "revered" text on rural guerrilla warfare, its publication in *Tricontinental* carries an even greater significance.

Without batting an ideological eye, Cuba continued its endorsement of urban terror tactics on through the remainder of 1970 and into 1971. While still paying some lip service to the few largely inactive, sputtering, and ineffective rural insurgencies (in portions of Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia), the press kept the emphasis on the importance of urban terrorism. Following publication of Marighella's "Mini-Manual," the next issue of *Tricontinental* (March-April 1970) contained a 15-page article on the Tupamaros in Uruguay.¹⁶ Although strongly endorsing the efforts of this group, the author endeavors to show that their operations are simply an offshoot or urban adaptation of the Guevara-Debray thesis of a rural guerrilla "foco." Despite the fact that the two concepts are in no way similar and notwithstanding express rejection by the Tupamaros of the Guevara-Debray viewpoint, the author still tries to meld the two in order to show that the Tupamaros are acting in accordance with Cuban guerrilla theory. Thus, although Cuba has now strongly endorsed the utility of urban terrorism as a major element in guerrilla warfare, the Castro government is not yet fully prepared to admit that its past support for rural-based guerrilla operations was a serious error. Instead, it would rather show urban insurgency as merely an expansion on the basic strategy of guerrilla warfare already laid down by Guevara and Debray in their "foco" concept.

While using such semantic sleight of hand

in trying to take credit for successes of the Tupamaros and other urban insurgent groups, Cuba has strongly supported these groups throughout 1970 and so far in 1971. In the pages of *Tricontinental* as well as those of *Granma* and *Verde Olivo* (organs of the Cuban Communist Party and Army respectively), the Castro regime has continued to praise the efforts of such varied urban insurgent groups as the Armed Commandos of Liberation in Puerto Rico, the urban-oriented sector of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Guatemala, the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard in Brazil, and the Argentine Revolutionary Movement. When Cuban assistance and support (which easily could include training and funding) to these and similar groups are combined with the natural advantages already possessed by most urban insurgent groups, it would appear more than likely that this form of guerrilla warfare will continue to expand in scope and intensity well into the 1970s.

While urban terrorism unquestionably poses a very real and current problem for several Latin American governments, the less evident but equally effective technique of peaceful penetration by Communists into a nation's social and governmental structure should not be ignored. The recent electoral success of the Communist-Socialist front in Chile has done much to restore life to this technique, which recently had been under severe criticism by the more activist revolutionaries of Cuban and Chinese Communist persuasion. Strongly endorsed by the "orthodox" Moscow-oriented Communist parties of Latin America, this less spectacular method of operation may over the long run pose an equal or greater danger to Latin American democracy than the current emphasis on urban terrorism.

As the shift from rural to urban-based insurgency continues, it will have a significant impact on current counterinsurgency strategy and tactics. Virtually all current counterinsurgency doctrine is formulated on the premise

that counterinsurgent forces will be fighting a rural-based guerrilla movement whose basic strategy follows the Maoist dictum of first taking the countryside and then engulfing the cities. The counterinsurgent strategy developed to meet this threat involves the employment of conventional military forces to deny the guerrillas access to their external sources of supply, to expel their armed forces from a selected geographic area, and to establish military control over that area. Additional aspects of this strategy include eliminating the infrastructure or underground organization within the area which has supported the guerrilla and then, through a combined program of pacification, civic action, and psychological warfare, winning the support of the populace for the counterinsurgent cause so they will actively participate in continued denial of the area to the insurgent. An integral and central part of this overall strategy is clearing and holding successive amounts of terrain and a continuing effort by the counterinsurgent forces to draw the guerrillas into a position where they must engage in conventional military action. Conventional military action allows the superior firepower of the counterinsurgent armed forces to be brought to bear with maximum effectiveness, thus insuring the destruction of the military forces of the guerrilla movement.

Conventional counterinsurgency tactics and techniques, such as search and destroy and cordon and search operations, air interdiction and air mobility, isolation of the guerrilla from the population through the establishment of fortified villages or hamlets, and other similar programs—all have been developed in response to insurgency that is primarily rural-based. Even those programs designed to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure, such as the Phung Hoang program in Vietnam, are of secondary importance in relation to the main goals of destroying the insurgents' armed forces and winning the support of the people.¹⁷

WHILE these tactics and techniques are valid and have proven effective in dealing with rural-based insurgencies, it takes little imagination to see they are almost totally ineffective against urban insurgents who are so enmeshed in the population that it is virtually impossible to identify, isolate, and neutralize them. Conventional military forces, then, even those trained in specialized counterinsurgency techniques, are ineffective in that situation because they cannot deny the guerrilla terrain, they cannot isolate him from the population, and they cannot force him into a position where they can employ their most effective weapon—superior firepower.

Those adjunctive programs designed to win "the hearts and minds" of the people are similarly of limited effectiveness because the need for popular support is not as critical to the urban insurgent as it is to the rural-based guerrilla. Since the urban guerrilla does not depend on the population at large to any great extent for food, arms, medical supplies, money, or intelligence, its support is not a prerequisite for success. In fact, the urban insurgent may well be able to operate effectively even if the bulk of the urban population opposes him, since it is as difficult for the population in any given urban area to determine who is guerrilla as it is for the counterinsurgent forces. This has been evident in the inability of various Latin American nations to locate and rescue the victims of guerrilla kidnappings, despite the victim's and his captors' continued presence in the urban environment. Operational effectiveness in the absence of widespread popular support is illustrated by the Tupamaros in Uruguay, who draw their support primarily from intellectual, student and upper-middle-class groups rather than from the middle and lower classes which constitute the bulk of the urban population.

If, then, regular military forces employing traditional counterinsurgency tactics and techniques designed to combat rural guerrillas are either ineffective or cannot profitably be em

ployed against an urban insurgency, the burden of combating the urban guerrilla movement falls on the local metropolitan police and those internal security or paramilitary forces which are responsible to some degree for the exercise of the police function. In effect, counterinsurgency becomes a police problem, not a military problem. Unfortunately, most urban police departments, not only in Latin America but in most major cities throughout the underdeveloped world, are unprepared to cope with urban insurgency of any significant proportions. Small in numbers, often underpaid, ill-equipped, and poorly trained, the police are nearly overwhelmed by the task of maintaining a semblance of law and order in urban areas swollen beyond capacity by the influx of a rootless peasantry escaping from the grinding poverty of the countryside. Such police departments have neither the capability nor the resources needed to carry out a successful counterinsurgency program.

In combating an urban insurgency, regardless of whether it emanates from the left or right of the political spectrum, the role of intelligence is paramount. The success of any urban counterinsurgency program is tied directly to success of the intelligence effort because the urban insurgent holds no terrain and maintains no formally constituted conventional military forces. His organization is essentially covert and clandestine and normally is highly compartmentalized as a security measure whereby each person's knowledge of the underground structure is restricted to that which is necessary for him to perform his function. This is designed to prevent a roll-up of the entire organization if a member is captured and turns informant or if any element of the organization is penetrated by security forces. The urban guerrilla, able to move with relative freedom, capable of plausibly explaining his presence in virtually any part of the city, and possessing a natural and legitimate cover for his activities, is extremely difficult to

identify and isolate. To attack him successfully requires a successful attack on his underground structure. Thus the counterinsurgent must depend on his intelligence to tell him who the insurgent is, where he is located, and what his plans, intentions, and capabilities are.

All this information, essential for the successful neutralization of the urban insurgent movement, becomes available only through a comprehensive and sophisticated intelligence program that penetrates the insurgent organization at every level. Most police departments and internal security agencies often lack, among other things, both the training and experience necessary for the conduct of a successful intelligence program simply because, until faced with the task of combating an urban insurgency, there was little need for them to have any more than a rudimentary knowledge of intelligence techniques and methodology. Until now, police departments and internal security agencies needed only low-level informants who could provide information related almost exclusively to criminal matters or to surveillance of relatively overt political opposition groups. This is no longer the case. To counter urban insurgency effectively requires a massive intelligence effort, the most important aspect of which is the use of reliable, carefully selected, and well-trained informants who can and will penetrate the urban guerrilla movement and provide the information necessary for its neutralization. The training required to identify, assess, recruit, train, manage, and utilize such informants far exceeds even the most sophisticated intelligence training normally given such departments and agencies.

If Latin American countries are going to be faced with increasing or intensified urban insurgency in the coming decade, there must be a major change in the type of counterinsurgency training and assistance given them. Rather than concentrate on improving the quality and size of their conventional military

forces and gearing training in counterinsurgency tactics and techniques to cope with rural-based insurgency, emphasis and priority must be placed on improving the quality and effectiveness of their urban police departments and those other internal security agencies which will bear the brunt of the urban counterinsurgency effort. The size of the police and internal security forces must be increased significantly; salaries must be kept comparable to civilian pay so as to attract qualified personnel; equipment, particularly communications equipment, must be modernized, mobility vastly improved, and inexpensive but efficient information storage and retrieval systems developed.

Training should be greatly expanded, particularly in those areas of direct usefulness in countering urban insurgency, such as intelligence, counterintelligence, crowd and riot control, and psychological warfare. Serious consideration should also be given to streamlining police organization and simplifying command and control over all elements engaged in the counterinsurgency program. It is essential to establish specialized intelligence components whose personnel have been intensively trained in information collection methods, including the use of technical surveillance devices, and in the techniques used to develop, recruit, train, manage, and utilize sophisticated informants. Particular attention should be given to "professionalizing" police and internal security forces, to preclude any wholesale loss of qualified personnel as a result of political changes in the government and to preclude the promotion of personnel based on political influence rather than on ability or merit. Since the police will have primary responsibility for detecting and neutralizing urban insurgency, failure to properly train and equip them to meet this responsibility will have the gravest of consequences. We firmly believe that urban insurgency cannot be defeated without a well-trained, well-equipped, and effective police department.

The importance and effectiveness of "professionalizing" the police and establishing a unified police command were demonstrated during the Venezuelan insurgency of 1958-1963. The government was hampered in its attempts to cope with urban insurgency in Caracas because the city was made up of several political subdivisions, each with its own police. In addition, national police responsibility was divided among three agencies—the *Policía Técnica Judicial* (PTJ), the *Dirección General de Policía* (DIGEPOL), and the *Policía de Tránsito* (Traffic Police). In both the PTJ and DIGEPOL, the overriding consideration in personnel selection was political loyalty and party standing. The situation improved significantly with the replacement of the officers in charge of the police academy and the personnel section of the municipal police in the latter part of 1962 and the establishment of a unified police command for the Caracas metropolitan area in mid-1963. The former head of the armed forces intelligence service was placed in charge of the new command, and a police coordination committee, embracing both national and municipal officials, was created. Both these actions had a marked impact on the capability of the Caracas police to deal with the insurgents.¹⁸

Although the primary responsibility for meeting the threat posed by urban guerrillas rests with the police and other internal security forces, this does not mean that conventional military forces have no role in combating urban insurgency. On the contrary, the military can and will play an important role in any urban counterinsurgency program; but that role, rather than being primary as in the case of rural insurgency, will be secondary and supportive of the primary role assumed by those agencies responsible for the exercise of the police function. Conventional military forces can be used in a variety of ways to support the overall counterinsurgency program. In a tactical sense, they can be used to strengthen border controls to preclude outside

intervention and deny the insurgent an external source of supply. They can also be used to guard fixed installations likely to be priority targets of urban guerrilla groups, assist in riot and crowd control, develop and implement highway control measures, perform civic action and public works designed to win popular support for the government, and provide military equipment and facilities to enhance police communications and mobility. In a strategic sense, conventional forces can be stationed within easy reach of urban areas, thus psychologically inhibiting the urban insurgent from resorting to unrestricted violence and terrorism for fear of military intervention.

The value of having conventional military forces in close proximity to centers of urban insurgency must be weighed against the psychological damage to the counterinsurgent cause should they be employed. One of the major advantages of combating an insurgency with police forces is that it permits counterinsurgent propaganda to treat the insurgents as nothing more than violence-prone criminals rather than as ideologically motivated revolutionaries. This criminal image is difficult to sustain once conventional forces are employed.

Perhaps the most important area in which the military can assist the police is that of training, particularly in the field of intelligence. Intelligence has always been an integral part of conventional military operations, and the military normally has experienced intelligence officers as well as training programs in-being that can readily be adapted for use by the police and internal security forces. In addition to providing training in the techniques of intelligence, experienced military in-

telligence and counterintelligence officers can be used to augment police intelligence units until such time as the latter have acquired the training and experience to handle it themselves. Such use of the military would contribute materially to a fully integrated police/military counterinsurgency effort.

THE PROSPECT of increased use of urban insurgency and terrorism by subversive revolutionary groups in Latin America during the coming decade is very real. Should this pattern prove successful, we do not believe it unreasonable to anticipate its use by dissident groups in underdeveloped nations elsewhere in the world.

The advantages inherent in waging an urban-based insurgency combine to make urban insurgency extremely attractive to those groups intent on overthrowing the existing political and social order. Although countering urban insurgency is a difficult task, it is not an insurmountable one, provided existing counterinsurgency tactics and techniques are revised and emphasis is placed on equipping and training police and internal security agencies to carry the primary responsibility, with the military assuming its secondary and supportive role. As unpalatable as this may be to the military, which has long enjoyed primacy in the field of counterinsurgency, it is essential, since we doubt any urban counterinsurgency effort conducted by police and other internal security agencies can succeed without the wholehearted cooperation and support of the conventional military establishment.

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Notes

1. Frank Bonilla, "The Urban Worker," in *Continuity and Change in Latin America*, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

2. For a concise discussion of the motivators involved in rural-to-urban migration, see Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization and Social Development in Latin America," in *Latin*

American Radicalism, ed. Horowitz, de Castro, and Gerassi (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 140-76.

3. Thomas F. Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America" in *The Dynamics of Change in Latin America*, ed. John D. Martz (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 174.

4. Preston James, *Latin America* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1959).

p. 868: "The fact is that in Latin America the thinly populated areas are becoming more thinly populated, and the areas of concentrated settlement denser. It is in the cities, or in the densely populated areas around the cities, that one finds the greatest number and variety of economic opportunities . . . It is to the city, and if possible the largest city, that the countryman wants to go . . . this trend toward increased urbanization, taking people away from the empty areas toward the more densely crowded spots, is a basic fact."

5. Horowitz, p. 147.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

7. Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), pp. 24, 26, 41.

8. K. H. Silvert, "The University Student," in *Continuity and Change*, pp. 206-26.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

10. *El Mercurio*, Santiago, Cuba, 14 November 1970, p. 1. and the *Star*, Washington, D.C., 14 November 1970, p. A-2. On 13 November Tupamaro elements robbed a branch office of the Bank of the Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay, taking \$6 million in jewels and \$48,000 in cash.

11. *Arriba*, Madrid, Spain, 2 February 1971, p. 12.

12. Castro, for example, focused his guerrilla activity in Cuba's Oriente Province, an area where 60.2 percent of the population is rural, the highest in Cuba. Antonio Núñez Jiménez, *Geografía de Cuba* (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1960), p. 191.

13. For the importance of these concepts in Maoist doctrine see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages

Press, 1965), pp. 93-101, and Vol. I, pp. 13-19. For an analysis of the failure of the Peruvian insurgency see Héctor Béjar, *Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). This book was published originally in Spanish as *Peru 1965: Apuntes Sobre Una Experiencia Guerrillera*.

14. Debray, pp. 68-69.


15. *Tricontinental*, Havana, Cuba, OSPAAAL, nr 16, January-February 1970.

16. *Tricontinental*, nr 17, March-April 1970, pp. 45-60.

17. *Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook*, Headquarters U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, November 1970, pp. 2-3. It is interesting to note that the introduction to this handbook states that the primary operating element of the Phung Hoang program is the RVN National Police and not the military forces, although the military does have an important but primarily supportive role in the program. "Phung Hoang" is the term given to the Republic of Vietnam's program to detect and neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). The VCI is the Communist shadow government which provides money, recruits, supplies, intelligence, and support to Viet Cong military units. The U.S. advisory effort in support of the Phung Hoang program is called "Phoenix."

18. For an excellent analysis of the police role during the 1958-63 insurgency in Venezuela, see D. M. Condit *et al.*, *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, Vol. III, *The Experience in Africa and Latin America* (Washington: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), pp. 484-88.

Military Affairs Abroad



NATO'S THIRD DIMENSION

MARSHALL E. WILCHER

THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which commemorated its twentieth anniversary in 1969, has been an unqualified success as a defensive military alliance, maintaining the territorial integrity of the member nations. In addition to this military aspect of the alliance, throughout its history there has been considerable political consultation among NATO governments. Nevertheless, some scholars have pictured NATO as somewhat dysfunctional in its role as a regional organization under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.¹

NATO's efforts have been almost wholly military/political in nature, and efforts in the more functional economic, cultural, and social spheres were accorded only token recognition. In the face of a grave threat to the security of Western and Central Europe, it seems natural that the alliance was preoccupied mainly with a security posture that would provide a basis for economic recovery and political stability.

The maintenance of this security position dictated that the focus of the alliance rest on military considerations.

As the estimated severity of the military threat diminished, evidenced by the Harmel Report of 1967, NATO entered an era of détente, recognizing that détente and defense were compatible pursuits.² The alliance was seeking a more active role in exploring ways of reducing tension. Thus the last few years have seen NATO striving to expand its nonmilitary efforts.

NATO's military and political dimensions, faced with the possibility of U.S. troop reductions and a cooling of U.S.-Soviet relations, were buoyed by the renewed solidarity expressed at the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1970. At that meeting the allies agreed on conditions for a European Security Conference, and the United States, Canada, and the major European members agreed on

a \$10-billion five-year plan designed to improve the NATO defense posture. In addition, President Nixon pledged that no substantial troop reductions would be made without reciprocal reductions by the Soviet Union. One observer considered that the statements of the leaders of the major NATO powers reflected a tendency to place "détente" in a secondary role and that the meeting appeared to give NATO a more militant aspect than any meeting since the one immediately following the Russian action in Czechoslovakia in 1968.³

In the general atmosphere of détente that has prevailed during the last few years, resulting from what most consider to be a decreasing military threat, NATO's *raison d'être* has been threatened, and its continued existence has become open to conjecture. At the very least, the nature and thrust of NATO's future role have come under scrutiny.

What has been called NATO's "third dimension" was added at a time when NATO was searching for new avenues of expression as an international organization. The impetus for NATO's new dimension was provided by President Nixon at the 43d Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington in 1969. In an address to the session, President Nixon pointed out that NATO is more than a military alliance and that the time had come to devote more attention to those nonmilitary aspects which could result in mutual benefits for all members. Elaborating on this theme, the President said:

... I strongly urge that we create a committee on the challenges of modern society, responsible to the Deputy Ministers, to explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshalled toward improving the quality of life of our people. That goal is provided for in Article 2 of our treaty, but it has never been the center of our concerns. . . .⁴

The President further commented on possible areas of concern for the third dimension. He indicated that he did not consider that a NATO

thrust in these areas would be competitive with other international organizations.

The North Atlantic Council, in a communiqué issued at the close of the 43d session, expressed a concern for environmental problems and instructed the Permanent Representatives to study this area in order to determine the manner in which NATO could contribute most effectively in these pursuits.⁵

In December 1969 the North Atlantic Council established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) as the organizational instrument to work on common environmental and social problems and to stimulate action by member nations of the alliance in these areas. The committee was instructed to submit a progress report to the spring 1970 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At the first meeting of the CCMS in December 1969, the body considered several pilot studies of environmental and social significance. The committee agreed to recommend to the North Atlantic Council that these pilot studies be undertaken as a first step. In January 1970 the council approved eight pilot projects, each with a nation designated to be responsible for it:

1. Road Safety, with the United States as pilot nation;
2. Disaster Relief, with the United States as pilot and Italy as co-pilot nation;
3. Air Pollution, with the United States as pilot and Turkey as co-pilot nation;
4. Open Waters Pollution with Belgium as pilot, and Portugal and France as co-pilot nations;
5. Inland Water Pollution, with Canada as pilot nation;
6. The problems of individual and group motivations in a modern industrial society—with emphasis on individual fulfilment. The United Kingdom will act as pilot nation;
7. The problem of transmission of scientific knowledge to the decision-making sectors of governments. The Federal Republic of Germany is to act as pilot nation for this project;
8. Environment and the strategy of territorial development.⁶

The CCMS is concerned with two basic themes: (1) the "pilot study" concept, in which one country (often in association with another) is made responsible for a study on a particular subject; and (2) the idea that the committee efforts are directed not towards carrying out research but towards the stimulation of governmental policy formulation and possible legislation in the fields of interest. The work of the committee is to be open, and cooperation with other international organizations and/or nonmember states is envisaged.

Thus it can be seen that NATO has taken on a third dimension in an effort to fulfill the promise of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, there is doubt in the minds of many as to the propriety or necessity of NATO's involvement in these more functional tasks. Critics generally express concern about the utility of NATO as an effective instrument for progress in the environmental and social areas, citing possible duplication of effort and conflict with other international organizations also dealing with these problems. NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs, Dr. Gunnar Randers, who also chairs the CCMS, has provided arguments supporting NATO's involvement in these nonmilitary pursuits.⁷

Dr. Randers has pointed out that an important basic fact is simply that NATO is there, i.e., the organizational structure and framework exist and have functioned for two decades. During this period NATO has provided the mechanism for considerable consultation and cooperation between governments and a great amount of technology transfer. In addition, problems of pressing urgency, if they are considered by NATO, have drawn the attention of the highest government levels in each NATO country. He further contends that NATO's concern in the environmental/social field is fully compatible with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Further, the fact that the NATO membership is made up of relatively advanced countries, having generally the same prob-

lems, makes NATO one of the few international organizations with such a common flavor (as opposed to other international organizations with a great diversity of members).

In response to charges of NATO's possible duplication of efforts of such agencies as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or European Economic Community (EEC), Dr. Randers considers that the problems of improving the environment in which we live are so vast and complex that they should and must be dealt with by many organizations. He feels that information or recommendations from two or more organizations may give a nation a better framework for making decisions and adopting programs; that the dual pressures of recommendations by NATO and another organization (for example, OECD) could give added political impetus to action. Some coordination with the OECD has already occurred, when nations have sent their representatives to the OECD Committee on Research Cooperation to the meetings of the NATO CCMS. NATO's Secretary-General has already discussed cooperative efforts with the Secretary-General of OECD.⁸

Dr. Randers notes that the CCMS does not conduct research but that it hopes to be a research-gathering agency, using existent knowledge and experience and making recommendations for governmental action. He maintains that the political weight of NATO may make it better suited to effect physical results than other international organizations, citing the NATO infrastructure program as an example of NATO's physical achievements.

Perhaps one of the most important results of establishing CCMS, Dr. Randers notes, is that it has brought the problem of the environment into focus in some of the NATO nations. Some of them had no government agency to deal with these problems and found it necessary to establish responsibility for environmental problems within their governments.

Another important facet of the third dimension is its potential as an area in which

possible cooperation can be achieved between the nations of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact, in a memo adopted in June 1970, indicated a general willingness to discuss cultural and environmental problems in conjunction with other mutual problems.⁹ Of course, the environmental problems are greatly overshadowed by the more crucial and pressing East-West issues. Nevertheless, the environment is an area that may hold promise for reaching agreements between the two blocs.

Regardless of rhetoric about NATO's rightful role in environmental problems, the organization has moved ahead in this field, seeking to deal with specific aspects of the problem. Meetings were held in Detroit in May 1970 on the subject of the latest auto safety devices. Meetings and discussions were also conducted in May and June 1970, on open water pollution, air pollution, disaster relief, and inland water pollution.¹⁰ It should be noted that two nonmember nations participated in one of these meetings.

In October 1970 the CCMS held its third plenary meeting to take stock of progress of the pilot studies. Observers from several organizations, including the European Economic Community, attended the meeting. In November 1970 a special meeting of the CCMS was held for the purpose of considering the conclusions drawn at the colloquium on oil spills sponsored by Belgium as part of the coastal waters pollution study. The meeting resulted in a declaration by NATO governments

to start work at once in order to achieve, by 1975 if possible, the elimination of intentional discharge of oil and oily wastes into the sea.¹¹ This declaration has been endorsed by the North Atlantic Council.

The December 1970 meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in an atmosphere of concern over possible U.S. troop reductions and growing concern over Soviet influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. That meeting devoted little attention to the third dimension. Nevertheless, the members seemed determined to make the third dimension an important part of NATO's future.

In May 1971, the United States and NATO jointly sponsored the International Conference of Cities at Indianapolis, to consider the common problems facing urban officials. Representatives of fifteen nations attended this conference.¹²

At the recent NATO Ministers Meeting in Lisbon, which dealt primarily with Soviet overtures for discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions, the Ministers expressed satisfaction in the impressive progress achieved by the CCMS.¹³ The Ministers took special note of the fact that the benefits of the allied efforts had not been confined to the countries of the alliance.

Whether or not there will be a continuation of the initial enthusiasm for the third dimension and interest in its adoption as a major NATO concern is a question that can only be answered by future events.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Notes

1. *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VIII, "Regional Arrangements," Article 52.
2. *The Future Tasks of the Alliance—Harmel Report* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1968).
3. "Nixon Gives NATO Pledge on Troops," *New York Times*, December 4, 1970, p. 7.
4. "Speeches at the Commemorative Session," *NATO Letter*, May 1969, p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. "NATO Council Approves Projects," *NATO Letter*, February 1970, XVIII/2, 14.
7. "Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society," *NATO*

Letter, January 1970, XVIII/1, 8-12.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

9. "Documentation," *NATO Letter*, September 1970, XVIII/9, 23-24.

10. "NATO's Work on Environmental Problems," *NATO Letter*, July-August 1970, XVIII/7-8, 7.

11. "'Actions'—Keyword of the CCMS," *NATO Letter*, December 1970, XVIII/12, 12.

12. "17-Nation Parley Focuses on Cities," *New York Times*, May 27, 1971, p. 52.

13. "NATO Seeks Talks with Soviet Bloc on Cut in Troops," *New York Times*, June 5, 1971, pp. 1-3.

Books and Ideas

WHAT WAS PAST
WAS PROLOGUE

DR. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY



<i>Sat</i>	<i>Mon</i>	<i>Tue</i>	<i>Wed</i>	<i>Thu</i>	<i>Fri</i>	<i>Sat</i>
1						1
8	3		5	6	7	8
15	10	11	12	13	14	15
22	17		19	20	21	22
29	24		26	27	28	29
30	31					

PRESIDENT Lyndon B. Johnson's "Tuesday Cabinet" of intimate advisers was unusual among such groups in that almost its entire membership was inherited by the President from the preceding administration. Professor Henry Graff emphasizes that among the "masterful figures" who made up the Tuesday Cabinet "the overwhelming force in their official lives was Lyndon Baines Johnson."† But although the President towered over those he inherited, it is the mainly inherited nature of the membership of his Tuesday Cabinet that seems to set the theme which permeates the book: that the Johnson administration, in its major decisions on foreign policy, claimed to feel its options closed in by history.

President Johnson was not a reader of history, but he was strongly influenced by the twentieth-century political history which he knew well through having participated in it, from the time of the New Deal onward. His sense that history was a kind of presence determining what it was possible for him to do and watching to render judgment upon him contributed much to the creation of this book. That sense of history made Johnson receptive to the idea that an account of the foreign policy deliberations of his administration should be presented the public by a reporter given freedom to converse with the major participants in those deliberations and that the reporter should be not a journalist but a historian. E. Hayes Redmon, an assistant to Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, had been a student in Professor Graff's graduate course, History of the Foreign Relations of the United States, while earning a master's degree in history at Columbia University. It was Redmon who suggested that Graff be the historian-reporter.

Graff spoke with the President and the members of the Tuesday Cabinet on the occasions of three major landmarks in the develop-

ment of the central foreign policy problem of the Johnson administration, the Vietnam war. On a fourth such landmark occasion he spoke with the President but not with the full range of Tuesday Cabinet members. In light of publications more recent than Professor Graff's book, notably the *New York Times* documents of June 1971, it would seem that one shortcoming of Graff's account is that his interviews occurred only after the most crucial decisions, including the decision to take the offensive in a land war, had already been made. The occasions of Graff's interviews were 9–11 June 1965, the eve of massive engagement in Vietnam; 22–23 February 1966, just after the 1965 Christmas initiative for peace; 19–20 December 1967 and 15 and 20 January 1968, the eve of the Tet offensive; and 19 November 1968, just after the halting of American air attacks on North Vietnam.

Almost every Tuesday, President Johnson met for lunch in the President's Dining Room on the second floor of the White House with his closest senior foreign policy advisers, to discuss the Vietnam war and the issues associated with it—thus, the "Tuesday Cabinet." When these meetings began early in 1965, the members of the Tuesday Cabinet were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. These three Kennedy appointees were soon joined by a Johnson man, Bill Moyers. At first, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was invited only occasionally; he became a regular member early in 1966. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, began to be invited at about the same time. Walt W. Rostow succeeded to Bundy's position and seat in the Tuesday Cabinet in 1966. George E. Christian replaced Moyers that year, and Clark M. Clif-

† Henry F. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970, \$6.95), 200 pages.

ford succeeded to McNamara's place in 1968.

At various times Professor Graff interviewed Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Moyers, Wheeler, and Rostow as well as the President. In his book he records the major points of his conversations with them and occasionally with other administration figures, such as Redmon and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, following his notes taken during the conversations and filled in immediately afterward. The purpose is to offer "a presentation and defense of an Administration's war aims to an historian by the men responsible for framing and implementing them, including the President himself." Graff's accounts of the first two sets of conversations appeared in the *New York Times Magazine* on 4 July 1965 and 20 March 1966. They appear in the book in fuller form and with the final sets of conversations completing the record. In the questions he asked during the conversations and in his presentation, Graff's posture was sympathetic to the Johnson administration, yet with the historian's appropriate detachment.

When Graff first started interviewing, massive American engagement in Vietnam had not yet begun, but crucial steps in that direction had been taken, apart from decisions behind the scenes which were not revealed to Graff: the first bombing of North Vietnam on 7 February 1965, the President's "Peace without Conquest" address at Johns Hopkins University on 7 April, and the landing of the first of 3000 Marines at Da Nang on 10 April. By the time of the first conversations, the administration had decided to raise the American troop strength in Vietnam to 60,000. At this juncture Graff found it conspicuous that, rightly or not, the leaders of the Johnson administration professed to think of themselves not as making critical decisions which would lead the country down new paths but as following in paths which history had already marked for them.

In 1965 Graff asked McNamara when the decision had been made to escalate the war in

Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense referred to 1954 and the commitments President Eisenhower had made to South Vietnam beginning then. The commitments still stood. The "escalations" had been initiated not by the United States but by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, as when their stepped-up activity had prompted the United States to increase the number of American advisers in South Vietnam in 1961, or when they destroyed American military installations in 1965. The American commitments remained unfulfilled, and as long as they did, "the mission itself remains unchanged." Similarly, McGeorge Bundy stressed the continuing nature of the commitment to South Vietnam. By December 1964, Bundy told Graff, a contingent decision had been made: that if the military situation in Vietnam did not improve, it might be necessary to bomb the North and increase the American military presence; the governing contingencies had now arisen. Similarly, too, Rusk stated that the American commitment to Vietnam had been affirmed long since, and the rate of escalation of the war had been determined by the other side.

The President himself saw only two options besides the Vietnam policy he was following: to adopt what he called the "Goldwater solution," use of nuclear weapons; or to pull out altogether, which he said was what such critics as Senator Wayne Morse and Walter Lippmann really wanted. President Johnson found neither of these options satisfactory.

This conviction that they were following a course which history had formed for them as the only course which would not sacrifice the interests of the United States still animated the leaders of the Johnson administration when Professor Graff spoke with them again early in 1966. By that time they had attempted their 1965 Christmas initiative for peace. On 23 December 1965 they had halted the bombing of North Vietnam and had dispatched American diplomats to capitals all over the world to explore every means of con-

tact which might open the way to peace negotiations with North Vietnam. "Our decision to stand firm," said the President in his State of the Union Message in January 1966, "has been matched by our desire for peace." But the initiatives had borne no fruit, and on 31 January President Johnson ordered a resumption of the bombing of the North.

On this occasion, Secretary Rusk reiterated to Graff the importance of this country's long-standing commitments. Referring to a suggestion by James Reston, that he had enunciated a "Rusk Doctrine" committing the United States to the defense of more than forty countries, Rusk commented: "I didn't vote for a single one of those commitments. Those guys did"—meaning the Senate. But, Rusk said, "When you go into an alliance you have to mean it. . . . If you abandon one commitment how do you expect us to persuade anybody else that our word is to be relied on?"

AT THIS JUNCTURE, Graff found even Under Secretary George W. Ball, whose reputation was that of a critic of existing policy within the administration, saying: "As far as we are concerned today, we haven't got any options. . . . I am greatly concerned over the hand-wringing I see. . . . The one thing we have to do is to win this damned war." The Tuesday Cabinet believed they had given Hanoi ample opportunities to negotiate and make peace. Since Hanoi had not grasped the opportunities, American commitments obliged the United States to seek a military solution, and the onus of guilt now lay clearly on the other side for having blocked the possibilities for peace.

At that point early in 1966, Secretary McNamara was announcing the dispatch of 30,000 more troops to South Vietnam to raise the American military presence to 235,000. Still, in their conversations with Professor

Graff the members of the Tuesday Cabinet continued to deny that the Vietnam conflict had developed or was developing into a large land war. "I begrudge the loss of a single man," said Secretary McNamara, "but the casualty rate of 250 to 300 men a month" does not betoken an "overt land war."

By the start of 1968, however, when Professor Graff next spoke with the Tuesday Cabinet, the President had scheduled a buildup of American strength in Vietnam to 525,000 men by the middle of 1968, and the evolution of American involvement into an overt land war could scarcely be gainsaid. By that time, too, rising public discontent with the Vietnam war was threatening the repudiation of the Johnson administration and the President's party in the coming Presidential election. In his third conversations, Professor Graff found the Tuesday Cabinet less sure than previously that history had compelled them to follow the paths they did; they were more questioningly reviewing their own record to find decisions that might have been crucial.

In early 1966, though Under Secretary Ball had then thought "we haven't got any options," he had differed from his colleagues in believing that viable options had still existed until the massive American engagement in the summer of 1965. By late 1967 and 1968, the members of the Tuesday Cabinet were coming to concede this view to Professor Graff. By the end of 1967, Professor Graff's renewed question to Secretary McNamara about when the war had begun no longer prompted the Secretary of Defense to look back to 1954. "It began at different times," McNamara now said, "but more important than that is the question, 'When were there opportunities for choice?'" He now said he believed there were "several Y's in the road," when "wise alternatives" had existed, and that one of them came between February and July 1965, when the massive American engagement began. But this was not the sort of thing he had told Graff in June 1965.

In this third series of conversations, Professor Graff talked for the only time with General Wheeler, and Wheeler conceded that there had been "surprises" along the way in Vietnam. He had come away from a visit there in late 1963 certain that the United States was on the right course militarily, that the war was progressing well, and that success of the ARVN—the South Vietnamese army—was practicable; but then, he said, the South Vietnamese government "proved feckless, and successive governments were increasingly worthless and ineffectual." In 1965 the ARVN began to fail, and the United States had to introduce its own troops to fend off collapse.

General Wheeler still believed military success could be achieved; Secretary McNamara, despite his talk of "Y's in the road," still maintained that the United States had followed the right course; and Secretary Rusk was still speaking in terms of the credibility of American commitments. But at the very least there was a new anxiety in the Tuesday Cabinet in late 1967 and early 1968 and a wistfulness about decisions made in the past. The most conspicuously hawkish figure Graff encountered at this relatively late date was Walt W. Rostow.

As for the President himself, Graff found that "by 1968 the clarity of his convictions, which had characterized his part of our conversations in 1965 and 1966, had given way to a bluer tone, less assured and more irritable." By the final conversations, when the President had announced the bombing halt and his term of office was coming to an end with his party in disarray, Graff concluded "—although not on the basis of anything specific that he said—that he believed he had been led down a slippery path by men he had relied on too implicitly, and that he would willingly barter anything he owned or deserved for the chance of being able to retrace his steps."

If it was advisers who led the President down a slippery path, Professor Graff does not

regard his reporting of the deliberations of the administration as entailing assessments of responsibility or blame. But some of the conversations he reports are suggestive about certain of the roots of trouble. The decision to bomb North Vietnam early in 1965 marked one of the Y's in the road, and surely so long a step forward in American involvement would seem to have merited clarity of judgment about the purposes for which the step was being chosen and the likelihood of accomplishing them. When the reader extracts from throughout the book the comments of various administration leaders on the bombing, however, and places them side by side, an absence of clear purpose is striking.

Why did the United States bomb North Vietnam? According to McGeorge Bundy in 1965, the bombing was chiefly important for maintaining South Vietnamese morale. Because the decisive confrontation with the enemy would have to be in the South, the bombing was irrelevant except for stimulating morale. "There is nothing to bomb for."

Under Secretary Ball, in contrast, offered in early 1966 a detailed summary of the arguments for and against bombing the North. As arguments in favor of bombing he cited that it was necessary to maintain the morale of the South and of American troops by denying the enemy immunity from the cost of aggression; that it was necessary to interdict partially the movement of military goods from North to South; that it was necessary to convince North Vietnam that the war would not be worth the price; and that it was necessary to resume bombing after the Christmas peace initiative of 1965–66 because a failure to resume would appear to be a sign of weakness. Against bombing the North, Ball cited the arguments that fear for the morale of South Vietnam had ceased to be a serious concern; that bombing for interdiction purposes could produce no political consequences because the enemy had small supply needs, which could be met by using human transportation and

living off the country; and that bombing the North increased the danger of Chinese intervention or at least made North Vietnam more dependent on China. Ball believed the controlling argument in favor of bombing was the one involving the interdiction of supplies. Once American troops were committed to Vietnam, he said, it became necessary "to do everything possible to minimize our losses."

At the same time, however, Bill Moyers said that while the bombing of the North was useful in restricting the size of the force the Communists could support in the South, "the overriding reason" for the bombing "is political: to put pressure on Hanoi and China. It will disabuse them of the idea that they can have a privileged sanctuary if they are going to sustain their aggression."

Walt Rostow, speaking just before the Tet offensive, argued that the purpose of the bombing in the North was not like that of strategic bombing in World War II. The United States was observing restraint. Bombing on the limited scale maintained was "an economical way to impose an awkward inconvenience. Hanoi must run its economy and logistical system at a lower throttle."

As George Ball's list of arguments for bombing suggested, the bombing of the North could well be viewed as serving several purposes. But the range of differing opinions which Professor Graff collected regarding the chief or overriding purpose of the bombing surely indicates a lack of clarity in the thinking of the Johnson administration about what it was that the American military force in Vietnam was intended to accomplish and thus a failure to think through the questions of both means and ends in the Vietnam war.

PROFESSOR GRAFF portrays a group of earnest, conscientious, responsible men, and one would hardly charge the Johnson administration with having involved the

country in the Vietnam war thoughtlessly or casually. In the conversations recorded here, and consistently throughout his administration, President Johnson revealed an acute and Lincolnian concern for the American lives being disrupted and sacrificed through continuation of the war. Yet for all that, there was something uncomfortably close to casual in the making of decisions, which at the time could be presented as historically preordained—the mere fulfillment of existing commitments—and which only later, when they were irrevocable, could be recognized for the Y's in the road that they really were. Nevertheless, it was in this light that the President and the Tuesday Cabinet presented their decisions to Professor Graff; if subsequent publications suggest that they were deceiving him, then our conclusions must be more disturbing still.

In an epilogue, Professor Graff emphasizes how his conversations with the President and the Tuesday Cabinet impressed him with the omnipresence of history in the deliberations of government. "In a great measure," Graff says, "this is because the perspective of American history has been flattened by television, the motion pictures, illustrated histories, 'restorations' of historical sites, and good history-writing. Public figures to a greater degree than ever in the past feel at one with their predecessors, and meet the ordeals of their office with extreme self-consciousness." The President especially, Professor Graff says, can never stand alone but is always in the presence of the history of his office and is forever playing the role which his predecessors have designed for him.

But Professor Graff warns that awareness of the past is not necessarily beneficial; "for untrained minds, it too often simplifies rather than clarifies." The minds of the Tuesday Cabinet were hardly untrained historically; several of the members were in a measure academic historians. Yet if awareness of the past did not simplify their problems for them, it did imprison them to a greater extent than

the past itself, without the awareness, would normally have done. The evidence of their early conversations with Professor Graff is that they entered the massive American engagement in Vietnam under the conviction that history was carrying them along in its train, that they were responding to history and not making new commitments and decisions.

They allowed history to condition their choice of means in fighting in Vietnam as well as their choice of ends. When Professor Graff asked Secretary McNamara in 1965 whether he found the analogy of Munich or of Korea more compelling in dealing with Vietnam, McNamara "focused immediately on the Korean episode." He conceded that an analogy between Korea and Vietnam was "false in logic," but he found the analogy "significant in psychology." Why? There would be "no sanctuaries this time." By implication, the United States would avoid the mistakes it had made in fighting in Korea and this time would fight a limited war to a successful conclusion without excessive cost. All through the 1950s American military leaders and strategic critics had restudied the Korean War and in doing so had re-experienced its frustrations. They had determined that the United States should never be compelled to repeat the frustrations of Korea; they called for the development of the kind of limited war capacity which, if it had existed in 1950, would have permitted at least a measure of American victory in Korea, not mere stalemate. One of the premises of the Kennedy administration, which carried over into Johnson's Tuesday Cabinet, was that the U.S. would develop a capacity to wage successfully a war resembling the Korean War. When the Vietnam troubles mounted in the early sixties, the administration prepared to respond by waging a successful Korea-type war in which there would be "no sanctuaries this time." But an excessive historical consciousness again played the United States false, for however ready the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations were to wage and win another Korean War, they were not ready for the war in Vietnam.

Judgments such as these, however, are only most cautiously and indirectly the stuff of *The Tuesday Cabinet*. Professor Graff's sympathy for the burdens of the President and the Tuesday Cabinet remains consistent to the end, and his purpose remains the detached one of compiling a contemporary record of decision-making "unprecedented in Presidential historiography." The record Graff presents is fragmentary, and because of his admirable sympathy for heavily burdened men his questions were not always so hard and probing as some might like, nor the answers as revealing. Still, the book will make a contribution to the eventual writing of the history of the Vietnam war.

Professor Graff found the men of the Tuesday Cabinet "strong, discerning, and gallant"; but he would also remind the reader that they were mere mortals, not "that fancied company of Solons who unerringly would have confronted the tragic challenge of Vietnam with full comprehension and perfect wisdom"; therefore, they should "not be judged by the yardstick of qualifications that they did not have—and no men possess." This comment is true enough, and appropriate enough; but the historian above all should remind his fellow citizens that history too easily can be turned into a tyrant foreclosing our choices, that an awareness of history may make our ability to determine our own destinies appear more limited than it really is, and that perhaps the first thing to learn from history is not to let it teach us too much.

Perhaps, by focusing on the handful of men who constituted the Tuesday Cabinet, Professor Graff's book conveys too much of a suggestion that a relatively few advisers led President Johnson down "a slippery path." Rusk, McNamara, and the other major figures of Graff's book remained loyal to Lyndon Johnson in his Vietnam troubles longer than

many of the other officials he inherited from the previous administration. But in the middle sixties the men of the Tuesday Cabinet were far from being alone—and in particular and despite more recent versions of history were

far from being alone among liberal Democrats—in the conviction that history had foreclosed the Vietnam paths other than the one which the United States found itself taking.

Temple University



100 AIRCRAFT ON PARADE

ROYAL D. FREY

WEBSTER defines "opinion" as a belief stronger than an impression but less strong than positive knowledge, also as a formal expression by an expert. Both H. F. King and John W. R. Taylor, who collaborated to produce *Milestones of the Air*,[†] are widely recognized as experts in the field of aviation history. They must now be considered as purveyors of understatement, for in the Foreword of the book Mr. Taylor—undoubtedly with the sanction of Mr. King—wrote ". . . the end product will, inevitably, cause controversy."

It is difficult to imagine any buff or student of aviation history reading this book and then not taking issue with the selection of at least one of the hundred aircraft chosen by these two men, regardless of their professional stature. They wisely provided themselves a route of strategic withdrawal, for although the dust jacket infers that the book pertains to *the* one hundred significant aircraft in the annals of aviation, the Foreword says "one hundred of the most significant aircraft ever built," suggesting that there are other aircraft of equal importance. This point, however, will probably escape the average reader, and he will assume from the dust jacket that King and Taylor have selected without condition what they consider to be the one hundred leading aircraft in aviation history.

Since *Milestones of the Air* is based upon interpretation of a vast amount of historical facts, it is without question a product of personal opinion. As the book's reviewer, I admit to an average level of human frailties and in this am probably little different from other typical aviation enthusiasts. Although I fully

agree with King and Taylor on many of their selections, I cannot help questioning their wisdom in selecting others, particularly since these aircraft are presented at the expense of some which I consider to be of much greater significance.

The criteria established by the authors for consideration and inclusion of aircraft in the book were three: that they "represent milestones in the technical or operational development of powered aircraft, introducing new design concepts, or advancing performance to a spectacular degree." It is on these three points that I must take initial issue, for I believe they are much too limited to permit a full review of all aircraft that should have received consideration.

There should have been two additional criteria if the book were truly to present the most "significant" aircraft in aviation history. The first would have permitted consideration of those aircraft which have had such a profound effect upon the world of the past fifty or so years that they changed in some distinct manner important public attitudes of the day. The second would have permitted inclusion of aircraft that influenced the establishment and maintenance of overall national policies to an appreciable degree.

It is not difficult to substantiate this position. In 1927 Charles Lindbergh flew the Ryan NYP *Spirit of St. Louis* nonstop across the Atlantic. This single flight by this aircraft, the only one of its exact type built by Ryan, completely changed the face of aviation. It awakened the world to the potential of flight as did no other aircraft for years preceding

[†] H. F. King, compiler, John W. R. Taylor, editor, *Milestones of the Air: Jane's 100 Significant Aircraft* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969, \$10.00), 158 pages.

and following its 1927 triumph. It completely captured the public's imagination and, in reality, signaled the beginning of the golden era of aviation which lasted for more than a decade.

One has only to ask the man on the street, be he French, British, American, or any other nationality, to identify the *Spirit of St. Louis* flown by Lindbergh and then to identify the Vickers *Vimy* flown by Alcock and Brown. To which is given the greatest recognition and recall by the vast majority of people? Despite this lasting historic impression made by the NYP and its significant impact upon society, it apparently did not meet the criteria established by the authors, whereas the 1919 flight of the *Vimy* across the Atlantic did meet the criteria, even though its impact on society was fairly negligible.

Another excellent support of my position is the U.S. Air Force Convair B-36 intercontinental bomber. Apparently the authors did

not consider the B-36 worthy of inclusion in their book. However, this aircraft was the only weapon possessed by the Free World in the late 1940s and early 1950s which could freely range over any potential target at any location on the face of the globe. National policy and military strategy, not only on the part of the United States but by its allies as well, were actually determined with the B-36 backstage, ready for use if needed. The fact that the aircraft was never employed in the role for which it was designed should not be permitted to detract from its tremendous significance and importance. In reality, the lack of any requirement to use it in retaliatory operations could be considered as the greatest of all testimonials of its true significance to history.

The Sikorsky *Grand* (p. 21) and the Dornier Do X (p. 66) were undoubtedly great design achievements of their eras, but what did they really contribute? In other words, would aviation history have been appreciably



different had they never existed? Few competent historians would argue that either the *Grand* or the Do X was of greater importance to the world than the 380 or so B-36s, their bomb bays loaded with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which served so many years as freedom's greatest cudgel against possible aggression.

This discussion brings to mind a situation that has occurred several times in the past. An individual, without doubt completely sincere, has come forth with what he believes is evidence that some unknown and unrecognized aviation pioneer made a successful powered, controlled flight prior to that of the Wright brothers in 1903. Without wishing to appear impertinent, one has only to ask, "So what?"

In order for any event to be of historic importance and significance to the world, it must have had some effect, favorable or otherwise, upon mankind. For the sake of discussion, let us assume that irrefutable evidence

has just been discovered that a man in Finland made a successful powered and controlled flight in 1859 but that he did absolutely nothing to spread the knowledge he had gained and it went to the grave with him. Consequently, his success was of no real importance to the world in the evolutionary development of flight as were the lessons learned and recorded by such great men as Cayley, Lilienthal, and Chanute for the benefit of those who were to come after them.

In a similar manner, unless I have been misled in my study of aviation history, the existence of the Sikorsky *Grand* and the Do X had very little direct impact upon aviation. They did exist and they were flown successfully, but memory of them serves primarily as a tribute to the engineering genius of the men who designed them. In themselves, these aircraft are now little more than oddities of the past.



Another aircraft that had a significant im-

giant leap forward


aviation was the New York to Paris flight of Charles A. Lindbergh in 1927 in the Ryan NYP Spirit of St. Louis.

The Free World's only global-range bomber for several years after World War II, the B-36 earned its place in aviation and military history merely by existing—a great deterrent.





Forerunner of more recent long-range strategic bombers, Britain's Handley Page O/400 flew night bombing missions from France over Germany in World War I. . . . The Hindenburg epitomized the historic role of lighter-than-air craft, making ten commercial round trips across the Atlantic before its fiery destruction in 1937. . . . The Waco glider, along with the Horsa, although minus an engine, played a significant role in defeating Nazi Germany.



impact upon the world, although in a more subtle manner, was the Handley Page O/400 bomber of the late World War I period. It was the O/400, along with the Caproni (p. 34), that made such a deep impression on Billy Mitchell. Employed by the British Independent Air Force, the O/400 flew at night from Ochey near Toul, France, on strategic bombing missions against targets inside Imperial Germany. Realizing the great potential of the plane, Mitchell devised a plan for 60 squadrons of O/400s, 20 planes per squadron, which were to drop paratroopers and equipment behind German lines in 1919 in the manner that became so important militarily during World War II. Although Mitchell died in 1936 without ever seeing his dreams realized by the U.S. Army, he left a legacy that did, indeed, become reality. The exact degree to which his revolutionary ideas were based upon the existence of the O/400 can never be more than conjecture, but the part played by the O/400 in the subsequent formulation of Mitchell's plans for a massive force of strategic bombers striking deep behind enemy lines cannot be denied.

Although the authors did not include lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles in their book, whether by intent or oversight, LTA craft do qualify as aircraft: "a weight-carrying structure for navigation of the air that is supported either by its own buoyancy or by the dynamic action of the air against its surfaces." Accepting this definition by Webster, the reader must agree that the famed *Hindenburg* should have received appropriate consideration. The loss of this dirigible at Lakehurst, New Jersey, in 1937 sounded the death knell for the rigid airship, for military as well as commercial applications. Although there have been periodic attempts to revive the rigid airship during the past 35 years, for all practical purposes the dirigible is gone and with it the dreams and aspirations of those who toiled so diligently through the decades to make it a practical and acceptable aircraft. The *Hindenburg* did

have an appreciable impact upon aviation and our society, though in a negative manner. It was, without question, quite significant to aviation history.

The Messerschmitt Me 323, a military transport developed from a towed glider (p. 108), appears to me to be of doubtful significance when compared to the Horsa and Waco invasion gliders that were so highly important and successful during World War II. Although the authors did specify "powered aircraft" for consideration, this is another point on which they should have relented, in that gliders do satisfy the definition for aircraft. Without question, the Horsa and Waco gliders made greater contributions to the world than those made by the contemporary Me 323 or such other aircraft as the *Mini Guppy*, the *Pregnant Guppy*, and the *Super Guppy*, all aviation monstrosities. (p. 144) True, the Me-323 did incorporate the features of nose-opening doors and multiple-wheel landing gear,

In the XCO-5, Lieutenant John A. Macready pioneered the upper air, acquiring knowledge that enabled development of the turbosupercharger in time to be a decisive factor in the air war over Germany and Japan.



but did these technological advancements have a greater overall effect on the history of mankind than the tremendous roles played by the Horsa and Waco gliders in helping the Western Allies defeat Nazi Germany? Did not these advancements have a lesser lasting effect upon our world, despite the present-day existence of the multiple-wheel landing gear on such aircraft as the Lockheed C-5A?

Even if one is not disposed to accept this reviewer's proposal for the two additional criteria, there are still many other significant aircraft which satisfy the original three criteria established by the authors but not presented in their work.

An excellent example is the XCO-5, an aircraft of little renown but of tremendous technological importance to the world. Originally designed and built by the Engineering Division of the U.S. Army Aviation Section at

McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, in 1923, the XCO-5 was extensively modified almost immediately for high-altitude flight to test the turbosupercharger of Dr. Sanford A. Moss then under early development by General Electric. New high-lift wings employing the Joukowski StAe-27A airfoil were designed and built, and the fuselage was remodeled considerably to ward off the effects of the frigid temperatures to which the plane was to be subjected.

In this craft Lieutenant John A. Macready made flight after flight into the unknown upper air, some even into the general region of 40,000 feet. The knowledge which this one man acquired with this one airplane, and which he brought back to earth for analysis, made possible the continuing development of the turbosupercharger, which ultimately was so widely used during World War II. How



The world's first production helicopter, the Sikorsky R-4, had its combat baptism in Burma in 1944, is now looked upon as the progenitor of a definitive vehicle in some present-day warfare. . . . The Martin XB-26H, modified from a TB-26G, first tested and proved the technical feasibility of bicycle landing gears, later used on hundreds of aircraft. . . . In a Curtiss R3C-2 Lieutenant "Jimmy" Doolittle set a world speed record of 245.7 mph in 1925, 19.1 mph better than that set earlier by Captain Henri Biard in a Supermarine S.4.


different might the history of the air war over Germany and Japan have been if the turbo had not been available for the B-17, B-24, B-29, P-38, and P-47! Without the knowledge gained from Macready's XCO-5 flights of the 1920s, it is quite possible General Electric would not have had the turbo ready for mass production at the time it was needed so desperately.

Bicycle landing gears, though not entirely a post-World War II idea, were certainly not engineered for heavy metal aircraft of high wing loadings and high takeoff and landing speeds until the Martin XB-26H proved the practicality of such an arrangement. This aircraft, modified from a standard TB-26G, was equipped with tandem main wheels and small outrigger gears for ground stability and maneuverability. Named the "Middle River Stump Jumper" for Martin's plant in Mary-

land, the XB-26H was tested extensively in 1946 to prove the technical feasibility of the bicycle gear which was later used extensively on hundreds of aircraft, including the USAF B-47, B-52, and U-2, the British *Harrier*, and the Soviet *Bounder*.

Another World War II aircraft to which the authors failed to credit sufficient significance was the Sikorsky R-4. It was not only the world's first production helicopter but the first to be used in a mercy role when on 3 January 1944 it delivered two cases of blood plasma to Sandy Hook, New Jersey, for the injured survivors of a destroyer explosion. This single mercy flight presaged a future for the helicopter which few, including the most visionary, would have believed possible at that time.

The R-4 was also the first helicopter to be used for rescue and evacuation in a combat



theater. In January 1944 it evacuated a wounded enlisted man from Air Warning Station No. F-76, located at Ponyo in the Naga Hills of Burma.

The initial operational use of the R-4 in Burma engendered that classic statement by the famed Colonel Phil Cochran, in a letter to a friend in the States, "Today the 'egg-beater' went into action and the damn thing acted like it had good sense." To appreciate this statement fully, one must realize that a YR-4 had been rushed by air from the States for rescue work in Burma, and once it had been assembled at Myitkyina North Strip and had taken off on its initial test hop, it presented such a conglomeration of whirling blades and awkward mannerisms that the old-time fixed-wing pilots gazed in utter disbelief. Small wonder they were so greatly amazed when it got into the air and then back down to the ground in one piece, as they had been told it was supposed to do.

I cannot help questioning the rationale used to select several other aircraft included in *Milestones of the Air*. For example, with reference to the Mitsubishi *Karigane* the authors state that its 1937 flight from Tokyo to London and return "marked the emergence of Japanese aviation as a momentous force" (p. 95) This statement is ambiguous, for by 1937 the world had already become cognizant that Japanese military aviation had progressed far beyond the point of being a mere token force. Were the *Karigane* actually so historically significant, it would be much better remembered by competent aviation historians, whereas in fact it is greatly overshadowed by such aircraft as the de Havilland *Comet* flown by Black and Scott from London to Melbourne or the Fokker T-2 which made the first nonstop flight across the United States. Could it be that the authors are giving more weight to "hindsight of the present" than to "foresight of the past"?

It has not been my intention to be overly critical of the authors' selections of aircraft

which were included in *Milestones of the Air*, nor do I wish to infer that my own suggested selections are sacrosanct. There is no question but that many readers will be able to designate aircraft of their own choosing which they could substantiate as being of greater significance than some which the authors selected or those which I have proposed. That is the risk which any historian, aviation or otherwise, must face whenever he prepares for public consumption a work that so greatly depends upon his personal opinions, interpretations, and evaluations. Suffice it to say that the authors have synthesized into one book a tremendous amount of factual data, and in general their selections are excellent.

It is my primary purpose to bring to the attention of those readers with minimal background in aviation history that they should be wary of accepting as gospel all the aircraft in *Milestones of the Air*. The book may be considered as a very accurate, authoritative source for data on 100 historic aircraft, but not necessarily the 100 *most* historic aircraft.

Despite the general excellence of *Milestones of the Air*, it contains some errors and omissions that should be noted for those who may eventually use it for research purposes. On page 52 there is the statement that the Dayton-Wright R. B. Racer was powered by a Hall-Scott Liberty Six 6-cylinder engine. This is incorrect, for although the R. B. Racer was powered by a Hall-Scott L. 6, the "L" was strictly a letter designation selected by the manufacturer and not an abbreviation for the famous Liberty. It is true that the L. 6 used standard Liberty cylinders and valve gear, but beyond that it was a different power plant. There was a 6-cylinder Liberty, but it was an experimental model only, made by Packard and not Hall-Scott.

On page 60 the authors introduce the Fokker FVII-3m as the most famous of "the Fokker commercial monoplanes of the 1920s and 1930s . . ." Though the material presented is accurate, I believe that the full significance of

the wooden-wing Fokker transport was ignored. While this significance was of a negative value similar to that of the *Hindenburg*, the Fokker most certainly had a deep and lasting impact upon the development of commercial aviation, particularly in the United States. On 31 March 1931, Fokker FX-A, NC-999E, of Transcontinental and Western Airlines, crashed to earth near Bazaar, Kansas, carrying its two-man crew and six passengers to their death. The accident received enormous publicity, for one of the passengers was the famous Knute Rockne, Notre Dame football coach and a leading sports celebrity. When it was learned that the Fokker had lost the outer section of its left wing while in flight, the public's reaction was so fierce that, rightly or wrongly, the airlines were forced to remove their wooden-wing Fokkers from service in order to remain in business. Potential passengers refused to accept the results of an investigation which found that the wings of Fokkers still in service were safe. Instead they placed their faith in the metal-wing Ford Trimotor. The wooden-wing airliner was doomed by this one isolated accident of a Fokker FX-A.

In discussing the Supermarine S.4, the authors point out that on 13 September 1925 Captain Henri Biard set a world's speed record of 226.6 mph in the plane. After its engine was tuned and a more efficient propeller was installed (suggesting an even higher speed potential), the S.4 had an accident and was unable to participate in the 1925 Schneider Trophy race, which was won by Lieutenant Jimmy Doolittle in a "Curtiss Army biplane with a speed of 232.57 mph. . . ." (p. 58) However, King and Taylor fail to mention that the day following the Schneider race, Doolittle flew this same biplane, the R3C-2, to a new world's speed record of 245.7 mph.

There is a glaring historical error in the statement regarding "massive employment" of the B-17 in operations over Japan. (p. 88) Although the B-17 was used extensively in the

southwest Pacific during the first year the United States was engaged in World War II, it was withdrawn in favor of the B-24, which had greater range for the long overwater missions that were required. The "massive employment" over Japan must be credited to the B-29.

In their presentation on the Fairchild *Packet* the authors failed to distinguish between the C-82 *Packet* and the C-119 *Flying Boxcar*, the latter name not even being mentioned. (p. 110) They also failed to point out that these two aircraft were more different than similar, and their statement that the C-119 was "a new and improved version of the C-82" is an oversimplification. The one and only C-119A was originally considered an improved version of the C-82, even the Air Force failing to realize the significant differences between the two aircraft. When Fairchild proposed conducting wind-tunnel tests on the C-119, the Air Force took the position that such tests were unnecessary—the planes were so similar that data accumulated in C-82 wind-tunnel tests could be applied to the C-119 program. However, when the C-119A was test-flown, the Air Force learned how wrong it had been, for the aircraft immediately evidenced serious stability, control, and structural difficulties that had not been encountered with the C-82. Extensive changes were made to the C-119A design to correct the deficiencies, but when the C-119B began coming off the production line both Fairchild and the Air Force realized quite forcefully that the difficulties had not been corrected, particularly with regard to directional and longitudinal stability. Various other measures were taken, such as adding and removing dorsal and ventral fins, but a constantly increasing accident rate supported the contention that the C-119 had totally different characteristics from the C-82.

In 1951–52 Fairchild went to the extreme of developing another design, the C-119H, to correct the problems of the production C-119.

Because of cost and performance factors, however, the Air Force rejected the C-119H proposal. Eventually, in-service C-119s became quite satisfactory through such measures as rewriting the pilot's handbook for single-engine speeds and gross takeoff weights. Nevertheless, the C-119 had quite a gestation period, the likes of which the C-82 never encountered.

The F-102 is referred to as both "Delta Dart" and "Delta Dagger." (p. 117) The F-102 is the Delta Dagger; the F-106 is the Delta Dart.

The general layout of the book is quite pleasing, but the publisher omitted the page number on too many pages. The Wright Flyer is listed in the table of contents as being on page 8, yet the first numbered page is 19. Certainly numbers should have been placed at least on all those pages that are listed under Contents. Furthermore, the table of contents would be more useful if alphabetized.

In some instances the authors stated where certain historic aircraft are preserved for posterity and can be seen. However, they overlooked various other aircraft that are also on public exhibit. For example, the U.S. Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, has been entrusted with numerous historic aircraft, including the XF-92A, the X-5,

a B-58A, both X-15s (one of which is on loan to the Smithsonian Institution), and the only MiG-15 believed to be on display outside the Iron Curtain. The NC-4 is at the Smithsonian; the Dayton-Wright R. B. Racer is at the Ford Museum near Dearborn, Michigan; and numerous other institutions around the world have such aircraft as the Me 163 and Me 262, the Sopwith 1½ Strutter, the Avro 504, the Mitsubishi *Zero*, and even a Junkers J1 and Ju 57.

To recapitulate, Messrs. King and Taylor have produced an interesting and useful book, well worth its cost. It should be of particular value to the student of aviation history who does not have ready access to all the issues of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* since the early 1900s or other reputable reference works, for it is a reliable source for obtaining or verifying basic historical and technical data on the 100 aircraft presented. Again I caution against using it as the final authority for accepting or defending those aircraft selected as the 100 most significant ones in aviation history. Someone well versed in the historical importance and significance of the XB-70 *Valkyrie* could present quite a convincing argument for its inclusion in the top 100 aircraft instead of or alongside the British-French *Concorde*.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Civilian Analysts, in Their Pride and Their Fall" by Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret), as the outstanding article in the July-August 1971 issue of *Air University Review*.

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